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Crime-Severity Distinctions and the
Fourth Amendment: Reassessing
Reasonableness in a Changing World
Jeffrey Bellin



ABSTRACT: A growing body of commentary calls for the Supreme Court to
recalibrate its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in response to technological
and social changes that threaten the traditional balance between public
safety and personal liberty. This Article joins the discussion, highlighting a
largely overlooked consideration that should be included in any
modernization of Fourth Amendment doctrine—crime severity.
The Supreme Court emphasizes that “reasonableness” is the “touchstone” of
Fourth Amendment analysis. Yet, in evaluating contested searches and
seizures, current Fourth Amendment doctrine ignores a key determinant of
reasonableness, the crime under investigation. As a result, an invasive
search of a suspected murderer is, legally speaking, no more or less
reasonable than the same search of a suspected jaywalker.
Through the years, the primary objection raised by the Supreme Court and
academics to altering this status quo is that a crime-severity variable would
be unworkable. While a handful of scholars continue to argue for an
increased role for crime severity in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, this
powerful objection remains unanswered. In an effort to fill this void in the
debate, and introduce crime severity as a critical component of a revitalized
search and seizure jurisprudence, this Article proposes a concrete framework
for incorporating crime severity into Fourth Amendment doctrine. The
Article then explores specific applications of the framework to highlight the
constructive role crime-severity distinctions can play in defining the
constitutional parameters of searches and seizures in the modern era.
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INTRODUCTION
Few people objected when Los Angeles police relied on the
controversial practice of familial DNA searches to identify a suspect in the
“Grim Sleeper” serial-killer case.1 For those who might worry about the
implications of such searches, the reporting noted that the California
Attorney General only permitted familial DNA searches in investigations of
“major violent crimes,” such as murder or rape.2 Slightly more controversy
attended the Governor of New York’s signing of legislation that prohibited
New York City police from creating a massive computerized database of
persons they stopped, even if those persons were not charged with any
crime.3 The police claimed the database helped crack cases, but the
Governor explained that he could not condone the practice absent evidence
that it stopped “very serious crime, or . . . acts of terrorism.”4 Finally,
condemnation was nearly universal when a Pennsylvania school district,
suspecting the theft of some school-issued laptop computers, activated
software in the computers that surreptitiously took pictures of students and
their families in their homes.5 The technology helped locate the missing

1. See David R. Cameron, DNA Matching Technique Is a Powerful Tool for Police, HARTFORD
COURANT, July 13, 2010, http://articles.courant.com/2010-07-13/news/hc-op-familialsearching-cameron-071320100713_1_offender-profiles-dna-expert-new-dna-technique (noting
that “even critics of aggressive approaches to gathering DNA . . . applauded how familial
searching was used in the Grim Sleeper case” and quoting an attorney with the American Civil
Liberties Union of Southern California, who commented, “From our perspective, if you are
going to use familial DNA searching, this is the kind of case you should use it for” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Elizabeth Joh, The Grim Sleeper and DNA: There’s Much To Be Concerned
About, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/10/opinion/la-oe-johdna-20100710 (cautioning that the “investigative triumph” of the Grim Sleeper case should not
“blind us to the dangers of expanding genetic surveillance”); Jennifer Steinhauer, ‘Grim Sleeper’
Arrest Fans Debate on DNA Use, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2010, at A14 (reporting expert consensus that
“[t]he arrest in the protracted, gory case could settle the internal debate among lawmakers and
the law enforcement agencies across the country” regarding familial DNA searches).
2. Press Release, Cal. Att’y Gen.’s Office, California’s Familial DNA Search Program
Identifies Suspected “Grim Sleeper” Serial Killer (July 7, 2010), available at http://ag.ca.gov/
newsalerts/release.php?id=1945 (explaining that under internal guidelines, familial DNA
searches “are only allowed in major violent crimes when there is a serious risk to public safety
and all other investigative leads have been exhausted”); see Editorial, A Yellow Light to DNA
Searches, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2010, at A24; Post-Standard Editorial Board, DNA Searches: Partial
Matches Can Help Solve Crimes—If Used Carefully, SYRACUSE.COM BLOG (July 15, 2010, 6:15 PM),
http://blog.syracuse.com/opinion/2010/07/dna_searches_partial_matches_c.html. For an
extensive discussion of familial DNA searches, see Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and
DNA Familial Searching, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 309 (2010).
3. Ray Rivera & Al Baker, Police Cite Help from Stop-and-Frisk Data in 170 Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 2010, at A15.
4. Id.
5. John P. Martin, Judge Orders L. Merion To Halt Monitoring, PHILLY.COM (May 15, 2010),
http://articles.philly.com/2010-05-15/news/24960045_1_webcams-laptops-injunction (noting
the school district’s acceptance of responsibility and apology to students and their families).
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laptops but was derided as “overkill,” saddling the school district with a
“coast-to-coast onslaught of negative publicity.”6 These examples, all drawn
from the last year, highlight the rapid changes unfolding in the landscape of
criminal investigation and, simultaneously, expose a flaw in existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine’s ability to respond to these changes—its failure to
consider a variable that nonjudicial decision-makers routinely rely on in this
context, crime severity.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable” searches and
seizures.7 A key intuitive component of reasonableness is the seriousness of
the crime investigated: “some crimes are worse than others” and those
crimes (and only those crimes) warrant a more aggressive law enforcement
response.8 Yet, Fourth Amendment doctrine is “transsubstantive,” meaning
that “Fourth Amendment law generally treats all crimes alike.”9 Apart from
circumstances involving imminent harm,10 the legal standard for evaluating
6. William Bender, Spying on L. Merion Students Sparks Probes by FBI, Montco Detectives,
PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 20, 2010, at 3 (reporting negative publicity along with criminal probes
initiated by local and federal law enforcement in wake of school-district surveillance); see also
Joseph Tanfani, How School Web Cam Debacle Evolved, PHILLY.COM (Mar. 21, 2010), http://
articles.philly.com/2010-03-21/news/25215619_1_web-cam-computer-files-school-boardmember (noting school officials’ retrieval of most of the missing laptops); Editorial: Untangling a
Legal Web, PHILLY.COM (July 20, 2010), http://articles.philly.com/2010-07-20/news/
24968967_1_webcam-laptops-school-issued (condemning district’s actions, in part, because
“[a]s an antitheft strategy, the webcam tracking was overkill”).
7. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
8. William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 875 (2001) (“[T]he worst crimes are the most important
ones to solve, the ones worth paying the largest price in intrusions on citizens’ liberty and
privacy.”); see also sources cited infra notes 28, 30.
9. Stuntz, supra note 8, at 869; Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct.
2633, 2651 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)
(highlighting as a “basic principle of the Fourth Amendment” that officers “can enforce with
the same vigor all rules and regulations irrespective of the[ir] perceived importance” and
noting that the “Fourth Amendment rule for searches is the same: Police officers are entitled to
search regardless of the perceived triviality of the underlying law”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.8(c) n.8 (3d ed. 2007) (“[D]istinction[s] between major and minor
crimes are rare in the constitutional regulation of criminal procedure.”); Max Minzner, Putting
Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 940 (2009) (“Currently, the Fourth
Amendment is blind to the type of crime underlying the search.”); Erin Murphy, The Case
Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1239, 1244 (2009) (“For better or for worse, we have a trans-substantive Fourth Amendment.”);
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2140 (2002) (“[M]ost
constitutional limits on policing are transsubstantive—they apply equally to suspected drug
dealers and suspected terrorists.”).
10. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart
an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a
particular route.”); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2000) (“[A] report of a person
carrying a bomb need [not] bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person
carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.”); Craig S. Lerner, The
Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 1010–11 (2003) (recognizing that “courts
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a search (or seizure) is the same whether a police officer suspects that a
person jaywalked or is the Green River Killer.11
Transsubstantive doctrine has real consequences. Perhaps the most
significant of these is that by opening a gulf between actual “reasonableness”
and doctrinal “reasonableness,” transsubstantive doctrine fosters artificially
permissive Fourth Amendment rules.12 From a judicial perspective, the
absence of a crime-severity variable means that in order to ensure that the
authorities possess wide latitude to aggressively (and often reasonably)
investigate the gravest offenses, courts must permit police to (often
unreasonably) apply the same aggressive tactics to the pursuit of less serious
offenders—a much broader category of investigations that includes most
police–citizen interactions.13
This often overlooked facet of Fourth Amendment doctrine will
become increasingly significant as new technologies—particularly those that
enable searches at opposite extremes of the invasiveness spectrum14—
challenge existing conceptions of what is and is not reasonable. The
examples cited at the outset of this Article only hint at the array of powerful
surveillance tools now available to law enforcement. New technologies allow
the state to investigate its citizens as never before, using satellite imagery,
miniature surveillance cameras, facial recognition software, DNA databases,
e-mail filters, and so on.15 The volume of personal data that the
have considered the gravity of the suspected offense” in evaluating “exigent circumstances”).
But see Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1976
n.67 (arguing that the case law seems to focus primarily on whether there is an exigency
unrelated to catching criminals, and “[t]he seriousness of the crime being detected or deterred
seems to be less significant (unless perhaps it rises to the level of ‘terrorist attack’)” (citation
omitted)).
11. For an example of a search upheld based on probable cause for jaywalking, see United
States v. Battles, No. 8:07CR337, 2008 WL 2323369, at *1 (D. Neb. June 2, 2008). For
background on the investigation of the Green River Killer, see Matthew R. Wilmot, Note,
Sparing Gary Ridgway: The Demise of the Death Penalty in Washington State?, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
435, 435–36 (2005).
12. See discussion infra Part II; Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757, 799 (1994) (“Judges do not like excluding bloody knives, so they distort
doctrine, claiming the Fourth Amendment was not really violated.”); John Kaplan, The Limits of
the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1037 (1974) (stating that “courts often stretch and
strain in serious cases to avoid applying the exclusionary rule” and identifying suspicious cases
of judicial distortion); Stuntz, supra note 9, at 2140 (“Judges and Justices are likely to think
about the effect of their decisions on the fight against terrorism even when the underlying cases
involve more ordinary sorts of policing.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Fortune-Telling and the Fourth
Amendment: Of Terrorism, Slippery Slopes, and Predicting the Future, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 195, 198
(2005) (“[I]t is hard to believe that the terror war’s shadow does not fall across all search and
seizure questions, for any case arising outside of a combat situation may lay a precedent that will
be of future use (or harm) in the war.”).
13. See infra note 81.
14. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
15. See Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on Technology’s Effect on
Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531, 533–34 (2007)
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government’s expanding surveillance arsenal can be applied to—much of it
voluntarily disclosed to private third parties (e.g., Facebook)—is expanding
as well.16 As courts address the novel, often breathtaking privacy intrusions
on the horizon, transsubstantive doctrine deprives them of a key variable for
assessing reasonableness. In fact, the courts’ inability to consider crime
severity may cause judges to resist labeling technological intrusions
“searches” altogether to ensure that powerful surveillance tools remain
available to authorities investigating the worst crimes.17
This Article proposes that courts abandon transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment doctrine. In particular, it suggests that as judges develop new
rules to apply the Fourth Amendment in the modern era, they incorporate
the severity of the crime being investigated into determinations of
constitutional reasonableness. The introduction of a crime-severity variable
into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would operate on multiple levels. It
would grant the government more leeway in investigations of the gravest
offenses, while simultaneously enabling concrete limits on investigations of
minor crimes. Perhaps most important, explicit consideration of crime
severity would minimize doctrinal distortions that inevitably arise (and favor
the state) when courts must judge all searches and seizures by the same
standard.18
Long before modern technologies made the issue so compelling,
commentators criticized the omission of crime severity from the Fourth

(setting out similar list of “powerful new surveillance technologies used by law enforcement
agents” with examples of usage); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 343 (2008) (describing the practice of “data mining” where the
government assembles personal data and analyzes it “for particular patterns of behavior
deemed to be suspicious”); infra Part IV.D.
16. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding
that placing GPS tracking device on the underside of the car of a person suspected of growing
marijuana did not constitute a search); Devega v. State, 689 S.E.2d 293, 299 (Ga. 2010)
(rejecting claim that police violated the Fourth Amendment by having the suspect’s “cell phone
provider ‘ping’ his phone” to obtain its location); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2000) (“[T]he state and the private sector now enjoy unprecedented
abilities to collect personal data, and . . . technological developments suggest that costs of data
collection and surveillance will decrease, while the quantity and quality of data will increase.”);
Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing Importance of Justification Standards, 94 MINN.
L. REV. 1514, 1556–57 (2010) (providing examples of how new “intermediated
communications technologies empower the police” and warning that “we are all being watched
more closely and more often than we ever have been”); Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic
Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1265 (2004) (explaining that modern
“technology has given the government an unprecedented ability to engage in surveillance”);
Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html (discussing radical changes in the
amount of information that people voluntarily place into the public domain).
17. See infra Part IV.D.
18. See sources cited supra note 16; infra note 71 (discussing Kaplan’s proposal).
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Amendment reasonableness calculus.19 The Supreme Court, however, has
persistently deflected these criticisms, arguing that a jurisprudence that
considers crime severity would be unworkable.20 Scholars advocating the
incorporation of crime severity into Fourth Amendment doctrine
presumably disagree with the Court on this point but have not answered the
Court’s workability claim. In fact, the existing literature contains little
analysis of the difficulties of incorporating crime severity into Fourth
Amendment balancing, and even fewer efforts to find plausible solutions to
those difficulties.21
In light of the increasing importance of transsubstantive doctrine in the
modern era, this Article attempts to answer the workability objection and
thereby reinvigorate the debate as to the doctrine’s merits. In Part I, it
explores existing transsubstantive, Fourth Amendment doctrine and
recognizes the Court’s few deviations from the transsubstantive norm. Part II
summarizes the surprisingly sparse commentary on this counterintuitive and
inconsistent jurisprudence, and emphasizes that scholars have failed to
address the primary justification for transsubstantive doctrine—the
impracticability of any alternative. In Part III, the Article acknowledges the
significant obstacles to incorporating crime severity into Fourth Amendment
doctrine, and proposes a novel framework designed to overcome those
obstacles. Finally, Part IV illustrates the potential for crime-severity
considerations to improve Fourth Amendment reasonableness assessments
and help determine the constitutionality of technologically enhanced
searches and seizures.
I.

TRANSSUBSTANTIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE

The Fourth Amendment speaks plainly, prohibiting “unreasonable
searches and seizures.”22 Yet Supreme Court doctrine ignores one critical

19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part I.B; infra note 48.
21. See Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 420 (2003) (arguing that scholars failed
to help the Supreme Court reach a correct result in Atwater because “[v]ery few writers
emphasized the importance of offense severity in reasonableness balancing analysis”); Volokh,
supra note 10, at 1961 (highlighting the potential significance of crime severity in
constitutional adjudication and noting that “[s]urprisingly, few works have so far discussed this
matter broadly and systematically”). Apart from a few roughly sketched proposals to limit the
reach of the exclusionary rule, see infra Part II, the only attempt to demonstrate how a Fourth
Amendment crime-severity variable could work focuses on the narrow doctrinal question of
implementing the Supreme Court’s vague directive in Welsh v. Wisconsin. See William A.
Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth Amendment Equations—Warrantless
Entries into Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 439 (1990) (discussing
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)); infra Part I.C (discussing Welsh).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Plain does not necessarily mean clear. The second “warrant”
clause of the Amendment creates ambiguity because it can be viewed as either narrowing or
expanding the first “reasonableness” clause. See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
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facet of the reasonableness of a search or seizure—the seriousness of the
crime under investigation. This Part summarizes the Supreme Court’s
general rejection of crime-severity distinctions in Fourth Amendment case
law and the Court’s argument that such distinctions are unworkable.
A. THE SUPREME COURT’S REJECTION OF CRIME-SEVERITY CONSIDERATIONS
At a sufficient level of abstraction, the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence appears well-suited to crime-severity
considerations. The Court’s opinions emphasize that the “touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”23 and recognize that even when a
search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, “reasonableness” remains “the
overriding test of compliance with the Fourth Amendment.”24 To implement
this “central requirement” of reasonableness,25 the Court attempts to strike a
straightforward “balance between the public interest and the individual’s right
to personal security.”26

ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 770 (2009). This Article proceeds on the assumption, shared
by most scholars and the Supreme Court, that the overall command of the Amendment is
reasonableness, with the warrant clause delineating a specific subset of that command. See
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 719, 722–24,
736–38 (2000) (citing James Madison’s original proposed text for the Amendment and
historical context to argue that its purpose was solely to prohibit general warrants, while
recognizing that other commentators “almost uniformly” accept “that the change [to Madison’s
original text] was intended to create a reasonableness standard for warrantless intrusions”);
CUDDIHY, supra, at 695 (arguing that even the original language proposed by Madison was
intended to broadly prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures: Madison’s original “meaning
. . . was not that general warrants were forbidden while other violations . . . were tolerable, but
that only one of many forbidden violations, the general warrant, had been sufficiently egregious
to require mention”); infra Part I.A.
23. See, e.g., Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548 (2009) (per curiam) (“[T]he ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment, we have often said, is reasonableness.” (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4
(2006) (same); Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (same); Bd. of Educ. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002) (“‘[R]easonableness’ . . . is the touchstone of the
constitutionality of a governmental search.”); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119
(2001) (same); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (stating that the “central
requirement” of the Fourth Amendment “is one of reasonableness” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Frase, supra note 21, at 375 (“The Court has stated many times that ‘reasonableness
in all the circumstances’ is the ‘touchstone’ of Fourth Amendment analysis.”); Christopher
Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 70 (1991) (describing that
case law establishes as the “most fundamental guideline . . . in determining whether a search or
seizure is ‘reasonable’” that “competing state and individual interests must be balanced”).
24. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559–60 (1978); see United States v. Torres,
751 F.2d 875, 882–83 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011).
25. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 330.
26. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 118–19 (2001) (“[R]easonableness of a search is determined ‘by assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” (quoting
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The Court’s emphasis on “the public interest” as a key Fourth
Amendment variable suggests that crime severity should play an important
role in Fourth Amendment analysis. The public’s interest in any search or
seizure surely depends to some degree on the seriousness of the crime
under investigation. Indeed, the close relationship between reasonableness,
the public interest, and crime severity can be found in the common-sense
judgments of “our daily lives,”27 popular-opinion surveys,28 pronouncements
of political actors (including statutes that limit search and seizure authority
based on crime severity),29 scholarly commentary,30 and even judicial
opinions31 with little, if any, dissent. Crime-severity distinctions also conform
nicely to the historical antecedents of the Fourth Amendment. The Justices
themselves occasionally note the integral role crime-severity distinctions
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)
(“We have described ‘the balancing of competing interests’ as ‘the key principle of the Fourth
Amendment.’” (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981))); T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 965 (1987); Frase, supra
note 21, at 348–49 (chronicling the development of general reasonableness balancing in
Supreme Court case law).
27. Volokh, supra note 10, at 1965 (“[I]n our daily lives we judge the reasonableness of a
reaction partly based on the harm that it aims to avoid [and i]t seems appealing to have
constitutional law do likewise.”).
28. See Christopher Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy, and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and
Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588, 1598 (2010) (recognizing that in opinion surveys, “the
seriousness of the crime under investigation correlated inversely with intrusiveness ratings,” i.e.,
people more readily accept privacy intrusions that target more serious crimes).
29. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C § 2516 (2006) (limiting authority of prosecutors to intercept wire or
oral communications to investigations of serious crimes); id. § 3142 (setting forth
considerations for holding suspects on bail based, in part, on crime severity). For
pronouncements of political actors, see supra Introduction.
30. See Amar, supra note 12, at 802 (“It clearly states a global truth that makes intuitive
sense to police officials and citizens alike: serious crimes and serious needs can justify more
serious searches and seizures.”); Volokh, supra note 10, at 1965.
31. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting) (“The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in evaluating the
reasonableness of school searches is almost too clear for argument.”); United States v. Torres,
751 F.2d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 1984); infra Part II.
A similar intuition is recognized in many foreign jurisdictions. See Craig M. Bradley, The
Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032, 1041 (1983) (discussing German example
where courts require that “the methods used in fighting crime must be proportional to the
‘seriousness of the offense and the strength of the suspicion’” (quoting T. KLEINKNECHT,
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG ¶ 19 (33d ed. 1977))); Yves-Marie Morissette, The Exclusion of Evidence
Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: What To Do and What Not To Do, 29 MCGILL
L.J. 521, 528–30, 554 (1984) (discussing consideration of seriousness of offense in related
contexts in the courts of Scotland, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Germany and noting
that a recognition of the salience of weighing the “triviality of the offense investigated” against
any contested privacy intrusion “pervades continental European administrative law”); Peter P.
Swire, Proportionality for High-Tech Searches, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 751, 760 (2009) (suggesting
that American jurisprudence would benefit from more “engagement” with the proportionality
doctrines applied in other jurisdictions, including Canada, Germany, the European Court of
Human Rights, India, Ireland, and South Africa).
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played in common-law limits on government seizure authority.32 As Thomas
Davies explains, at the time of this nation’s founding:
Warrantless-arrest authority was much broader for accusations of
felon[ies]. . . than for accusations of less-serious offenses. The
reasons are apparent: It was most important for public safety to
catch and punish the potentially dangerous criminals who
committed the set of very serious and often violent crimes denoted
as felonies . . . .33
Yet, for reasons that are never satisfactorily explained, the Supreme
Court’s evaluation of the public interest in the Fourth Amendment context
does not entail any assessment of crime severity. Instead, the public interest
32. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1985) (recognizing as “the common-law
rule” and the “prevailing rule at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment” that an
officer could “use . . . whatever force was necessary to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon, though
not a misdemeanant”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 616 (1980) (White, J., dissenting)
(“At common law, absent exigent circumstances, entries to arrest could be made only for
felony.”).
33. Thomas Y. Davies, How the Post-Framing Adoption of the Bare-Probable-Cause Standard
Drastically Expanded Government Arrest and Search Power, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
2010, at 1, 12 [hereinafter Davies, Post-Framing Adoption]; see also Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of
Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275, 1286 (2010) (describing common-law rule that
“authorized private homes to be searched for felons on hue and cry, merely upon suspicion”).
Although it has not decided the question, the Court suggested in Atwater that the common-law
in-the-presence requirement for a warrantless misdemeanor arrest is not a constitutional
requirement. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340 n.11 (2001) (stating that it was
not deciding the question, while simultaneously citing Justice White’s statement in Welsh that
the requirement “is not grounded in the Fourth Amendment” (internal quotation mark
omitted)); Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of
the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 239, 383 (2002) (stating that the Atwater footnote “strongly suggests that the majority
justices are unwilling to treat the committed-in-the-presence-of standard as a constitutional
requirement for misdemeanor arrests”).
Davies ascribes the movement toward allowing broad search and seizure authority for
misdemeanor offenses in the United States to the necessities of enforcing prohibition laws,
which “were often misdemeanors.” Davies, Post-Framing Adoption, supra, at 54. As Davies notes, so
much has changed since the founding that it may be impossible to return to the common law’s
understanding of governmental search and seizure authority. Id. at 67. It may also be
unwarranted as a purely interpretive matter. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 13 (stating that the
Amendment “has not simply frozen into constitutional law those law enforcement practices that
existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s passage” (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 591 n.33)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 820, 824 (1994) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment, more than many other parts of the
Constitution, appears to require a fairly high level of abstraction of purpose; its use of the term
‘reasonable’ (actually, ‘unreasonable’) positively invites constructions that change with
changing circumstances.”); cf. Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical
Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 927 (1997) (criticizing the Court for its inconsistent use of history
in interpreting Fourth Amendment reasonableness). For a discussion of common-law felonies,
see Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59, 90–91
(2004) (explaining that the term felony “originally referred simply to vicious acts” but greatly
expanded over the eighteenth century).
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is measured by the quantum of suspicion that a suspect has committed a
crime—any crime.34 Under existing doctrine, the public interest is somehow
just as compelling when the police are investigating an alleged shoplifting as
an alleged murder.
Fourth Amendment doctrine’s transsubstantive nature is so deeply
engrained that it most commonly operates by omission. In the vast majority
of cases, the Supreme Court, and thus lower courts, simply ignore the
underlying crime in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure. For
example, in Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court recently clarified the Fourth
Amendment parameters of a vehicle search.35 Neither the majority nor the
dissenting opinions suggested that the seriousness of the underlying
offense—in Gant, the misdemeanor offense of driving without a license36—
should play any role in assessing the reasonableness of such searches.
The various overarching verbal formulations that govern Fourth
Amendment doctrine similarly ignore the wide variance in the public
interest in solving different crimes. To detain (or arrest) a suspect, a police
officer must have a reasonable suspicion (or probable cause) that “criminal
activity is afoot.”37 A search is permitted if “the known facts and
circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the
belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.”38 When a

34. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997) (“To be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”);
Ohm, supra note 16, at 1555 (“Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure law . . . has always treated
probable cause as the principle tool for balancing privacy and security.”); cf. Torres, 751 F.2d at
882 (“The usual way in which judges interpreting the Fourth Amendment take account of the
fact that searches vary in the degree to which they invade personal privacy is by requiring a
higher degree of probable cause (to believe that the search will yield incriminating evidence),
and by being more insistent that a warrant be obtained . . . .”).
35. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
permits “an officer to conduct a vehicle search when an arrestee is within reaching distance of
the vehicle or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest”).
36. Id. at 1715 (describing lower court’s ruling “that the police saw Gant commit the
crime of driving without a license and . . . that the [disputed vehicle] search was permissible as a
search incident to arrest”); see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3473(A) (2011) (classifying offense of
driving without a license as “a class 1 misdemeanor”).
37. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (emphasis added) (explaining that
police may detain an individual based on “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot”); cf. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (“A warrantless arrest of an
individual in a public place for a felony, or a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence,
is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is supported by probable cause.”); Garner,
471 U.S. at 7 (“A police officer may arrest a person if he has probable cause to believe that
person committed a crime.”).
38. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (emphasis added) (describing
“reasonable suspicion” as “‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person
stopped of criminal activity” and “probable cause to search as existing where the known facts
and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found” (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 417–18 (1981))).
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warrant is required, the standard is the same, but a magistrate must first
agree that “given all the circumstances” there is “a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”39
The Court occasionally underlines the general absence of a crimeseverity variable from its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by explicitly
rejecting crime severity as a relevant consideration. In Mincey v. Arizona, the
Justices unanimously upbraided an Arizona state court for permitting
warrantless searches of homicide crime scenes.40 The Supreme Court
explained that, absent exigent circumstances, Fourth Amendment
“reasonableness” requires a warrant prior to a home search, and “the
seriousness of the offense under investigation” does not “create[] exigent
circumstances” that would “justify a warrantless search.”41 Six years later,
when state courts in Louisiana did not appear to get this message, a stillunanimous Court reaffirmed Mincey’s holding.42
The Supreme Court applied the principle invoked in Mincey to the
opposite end of the crime spectrum in the more recent cases of Whren v.
United States43 and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.44 In Whren, the Court declined
to limit the permissible scope of searches or seizures where the sole
legitimate government interest implicated was a minor traffic infraction.45 In
Atwater, the Court upheld, as constitutionally reasonable, a custodial arrest
for a nonjailable, seatbelt violation.46 The Atwater majority squarely rejected
the argument that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness command
dictated a more limited arrest (i.e., seizure) authority for a minor,
nonjailable offense.47
39. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (emphasis added); see also FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(d)(1) (“After receiving an affidavit or other information, a magistrate judge—or if
authorized by Rule 41(b), a judge of a state court of record—must issue the warrant if there is
probable cause to search for and seize a person or property or to install and use a tracking
device.”); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176–77 (2008) (explaining the rule “that officers
may perform searches incident to constitutionally permissible arrests” applies to “any ‘lawful
arrest’” (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973))).
40. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). Justice Rehnquist agreed with the holding
discussed here, making that holding unanimous. See id. at 406 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and
dissenting).
41. Id. at 394; cf. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9, § 3.6(e), at 223 (“Some courts for years
recognized an exception to the general rule that a search warrant is needed to search premises
for evidence, namely, that police could enter without a warrant to conduct an investigation at
the scene of a possible homicide.”).
42. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21 (1984) (reversing Louisiana Supreme Court’s
holding that detectives could perform warrantless search of home where homicide victim was
discovered).
43. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
44. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
45. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
46. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
47. Id. (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even
a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth
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In sum, despite its purported focus on the “public interest” served by a
given search or seizure, the Court refuses to incorporate a significant
determinant of the public interest—offense severity—into Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Apart from a few, isolated circumstances, discussed
below, the Court’s doctrine parts way with the common understanding of
“reasonableness” by neither imposing additional limits on searches or
seizures aimed at minor offenses, nor affording greater latitude in
investigations of the most serious crimes, such as murder.
B. THE WORKABILITY JUSTIFICATION
The Supreme Court rarely tries to explain the omission of crime
severity from the Fourth Amendment reasonableness calculus. For the most
part, the Court simply passes over the common-sense intuition that the
reasonableness of a search or seizure is connected to the seriousness of the
crime being investigated. In the few cases where the Court explicitly rejects
calls to consider offense severity, however, its emphasis has been on
administrability.48
In rejecting the Arizona courts’ limited homicide exception to the
warrant requirement in Mincey, the Court proclaimed that there was no
principled Fourth Amendment distinction between “extremely serious
crime[s],” such as murder, and less serious crime.49 The Court explained: “If
the warrantless search of a homicide scene is reasonable, why not the
warrantless search of the scene of a rape, a robbery, or a burglary? ‘No

Amendment, arrest the offender.”); Craig Bradley, The Middle Class Fourth Amendment, 6 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1138 n.69 (2003) (stating that, in Atwater, “the Court continued its
insistence that Fourth Amendment law, i.e., the reasonableness of a given search or seizure,
does not depend on the nature or seriousness of the crime being investigated”); Davies, PostFraming Adoption, supra note 33, at 64 (arguing that the majority “ran roughshod over the
historical limitation of less-than-felony warrantless arrests to ‘breaches of the peace’”); cf. Wayne
A. Logan, Reasonableness as a Rule: A Paean to Justice O’Connor’s Dissent in Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 79 MISS. L.J. 115, 129 (2010) (noting that “state and lower federal courts condoned
warrantless arrests, and searches incident thereto, for myriad minor auto and non-auto related
offenses” and listing offenses with citations).
48. Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,” 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1660 (1998) (“The Court has chosen to stay out of the area of substance
in evaluating most searches and seizures partly because of the subjectivity that seems to be an
inevitable component of nonquantitative reasonableness analysis.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Being
Proportional About Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 803, 849 n.145 (2004) (stating that the
Court’s “concern for the administrability of a rule against warrantless arrests for nonjailable
offenses may be of a piece with the more general phenomenon that Professor Stuntz has
criticized: the absence of proportionality between investigative methods regulated under the
Fourth Amendment and the seriousness of the crime involved”); Kaplan, supra note 12, at 1047
(“[T]he Supreme Court has never adopted Justice Jackson’s view, presumably because such a
rule would raise grave problems of administrability.”); Stuntz, supra note 8, at 870 (“The real
reason for transsubstantive law is practicality, the fear that taking substance into account when
authorizing searches or subpoenas will be unmanageable.”).
49. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
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consideration relevant to the Fourth Amendment suggests any point of
rational limitation’ of such a doctrine.”50 The unanimous Whren Court
similarly claimed that there was “no principle” that would enable the Court
to distinguish serious criminal laws from those that are “so commonly
violated” or not “sufficiently important to merit enforcement.”51 The
workability justification resurfaced in Atwater where the Court noted that
“complications arise the moment we begin to think about” potential
mechanisms “for drawing a line between minor crimes with limited [Fourth
Amendment] arrest authority and others not so restricted.”52 The Justices’
administrability concerns are echoed by commentators, such as Christopher
Slobogin, who argue that “basing any search and seizure rule on a severity of
crime factor” will be plagued by the “difficulty of discerning which crimes
are ‘minor’ and which are ‘serious.’”53 Slobogin adds that “even if a useable
definition of crime magnitude is devised, its application may be impossible,
given the realities of law enforcement; activity which appears to be a ‘minor’
crime at one point may well be, or become, ‘serious’ and vice versa.”54
While daunting in some respects, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the
purported impracticability of incorporating crime severity into Fourth
Amendment doctrine has a positive side for those dissatisfied with the status
quo. It hints at an implicit recognition of the absence of stronger

50. Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969)).
51. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1996).
52. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 348.
53. Slobogin, supra note 23, at 32 n.109; see Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, Catastrophic
Threats and the Fourth Amendment, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 810–11 (2004) (arguing that tailoring
Fourth Amendment protections to offense gravity “would be wholly unworkable for police in
the field in the first instance and for magistrates issuing warrants and for reviewing courts”);
Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 786 (2002) (arguing that “[a] sliding scale
approach” to Fourth Amendment doctrine “presents a variety of administrative and practical
problems” and detailing problems); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9, § 3.6(a), at 216 & n.9
(criticizing Welsh by stating that the dissent “correctly observed that the Court’s approach will
necessitate a case-by-case evaluation of the seriousness of particular crimes, a difficult task for
which officers and courts are poorly equipped” (internal quotation mark omitted)).
54. Slobogin, supra note 23, at 32 n.109; Volokh, supra note 10, at 1983 (stating that while
“[w]e may all agree that there is a difference between murder and littering,” it does not
necessarily “follow that courts can create administrable lines that distinguish the various cases
between the two extremes”). Slobogin fleshes out his critique in a footnote, stating:
At what point does an offense become so serious that police no longer need
probable cause to search a house? Should the dividing line be between felonies
and misdemeanors, between offenses that are considered ‘harmful’ and those that
are not, or should it vary from case to case, depending more on the nature of the
criminal act rather than the technical offense committed? And how does one apply
whatever standard is appropriate in cases where it is not known what crime has
been committed?
Slobogin, supra note 23, at 51 n.173.
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objections.55 After all, the Fourth Amendment demands reasonableness, and
in common parlance (as well as common-law tradition), the reasonableness
of a search or seizure depends a great deal on the severity of the offense
being investigated.56 Indeed, as the next section explains, the force of this
intuition is so strong that even the Supreme Court is occasionally unable to
resist it.
C. EXCEPTIONS TO TRANSSUBSTANTIVE DOCTRINE
A few exceptions to transsubstantive Fourth Amendment doctrine exist,
with the most acute arising from the case of Welsh v. Wisconsin.57 While

55. See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 870 (arguing that “no obvious principle requires
transsubstantive Fourth Amendment law”); cf. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008)
(acknowledging that “[i]n Atwater, we acknowledged that nuanced judgments about the need
for warrantless arrest were desirable,” but the Court nonetheless declined to permit them).
Slobogin raises another objection by analogy to other areas of constitutional criminal
procedure where protections do not vary based on crime severity. See Slobogin, supra note 23, at
52 (arguing that the transsubstantive nature of criminal-procedure rules generally “supports a
common-sense intuition: that differences in individual protections against government
intervention should usually flow from differences in the consequences of the intervention, not
from the nature of the crime”); see also Luna, supra note 53, at 785 (“[T]he fact that a given
crime is viewed as serious or harmful does not allow the state to circumvent or even relax other
constitutional rights, such as the reasonable doubt standard or the right to trial by jury.”). The
analogy is flawed, however, because in most criminal-procedure contexts, any offense-gravitybased increase in the government’s interest in conviction is offset by a countervailing
consideration: the innocent defendant’s interest in avoiding a more serious conviction. This
mirror image of countervailing interests is largely absent in the Fourth Amendment context. See
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 760 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) (“A warrantless home
entry to arrest is no more intrusive when the crime is ‘minor’ than when the suspect is sought in
connection with a serious felony.”); Volokh, supra note 10, at 1964 & n.20. One could argue
that a guilty defendant’s interest in avoiding detection increases as the severity of the crime
investigated increases, but the law (properly) does not consider a desire to conceal guilt as a
legitimate privacy interest. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–09 (2005)
(explaining that “[w]e have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed
‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband
‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest’” (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,
123 (1984))); Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to
Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1349 (2002). Other objections could be
raised, such as that vigorous and intrusive prosecutions of minor crimes may be reasonable for
the counterintuitive reason that such prosecutions lead to a decrease in serious crime. See Dan
M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 351 (1997)
(arguing that “[c]racking down on aggressive panhandling, prostitution, open gang activity and
other visible signs of disorder may be justifiable” under “social influence conception of
deterrence” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
56. See supra note 30.
57. Welsh, 466 U.S. 740; see also Colb, supra note 48, at 1682–83 (“The Court in Welsh did
something it has usually refused to do: It took note of both the gravity of the offense in question
(a ‘minor offense’) and the intrusiveness of the particular search (a person’s home, at night).”);
Stuntz, supra note 8, at 847 n.16 (noting Welsh as one of “a few famous exceptions” to the
courts’ ostensible indifference to crime severity, “famous precisely because they are
exceptional”).
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anomalous, Welsh informs the analysis in two ways. First, it undercuts the
Court’s claim in related Fourth Amendment contexts that offense severity is
an unworkable consideration. Second, and relatedly, Welsh highlights the
Court’s failure to grapple with the complex issues involved in crime-severity
analysis and thus the importance, even if current case law remains
unchanged, of addressing these issues in a comprehensive manner.
In Welsh, the Court rejected, as unconstitutional, the entry of a home
without a warrant despite the presence of an exigent circumstance (the
imminent dissipation of evidence).58 It reached this conclusion, in part,
because “the underlying offense for which there [wa]s probable cause to
arrest”—drunk driving—was “relatively minor.”59 The Welsh majority looked
exclusively to the state legislature’s classification of the offense—“a
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is
possible”—to reach its conclusion that drunk driving is a minor offense.60
This approach, it explained, constituted the best way to evaluate offense
severity as it “can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced
with a decision to arrest.”61 Apart from this sentiment, the opinion makes no
effort to guide lower courts in ranking the relative severity of more typical
(i.e., jailable) crimes, and fails to address any of the other questions
inherent in a jurisprudence that depends upon crime-severity distinctions.62
The Supreme Court also recognizes offense-severity distinctions in
excessive force, “seizure” cases. In Tennessee v. Garner, the Court deemed an
officer’s use of deadly force to stop a fleeing, unarmed burglar
“unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.63 The majority explained
that a seizure by deadly force is reasonable only in response to a threat of
physical harm, or if “there is probable cause to believe that [the suspect] has
committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious
physical harm.”64 The Court later confirmed that, under Garner,

58. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753–54.
59. Id. at 750 (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
60. Id. at 754.
61. Id.
62. See Schroeder, supra note 21, at 558 (advocating more concrete guidance for lower
courts attempting to implement the holding of Welsh); infra Part III.
63. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“A police officer may not seize an
unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.”).
64. Id. at 11. Garner’s explicit allowance for the use of deadly force based on past, rather
than present, dangerousness, is at odds with other parts of the opinion that stress the
importance of present dangerousness. Nevertheless, in a later case, the Court rejected an effort
to render this language superfluous, explaining that “[t]he necessity described in Garner was, in
fact, the need to prevent ‘serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others’” and that
“Garner hypothesized that deadly force may be used ‘if necessary to prevent escape’ when the
suspect is known to have ‘committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of
serious physical harm,’ so that his mere being at large poses an inherent danger to society.”
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determining “reasonableness” in this context “requires careful attention to
the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of
the crime at issue.”65 Thus, as in Welsh, the Garner Court recognized a Fourth
Amendment distinction between more and less serious crimes, and held that
only in circumstances involving the former category would certain
government actions be deemed reasonable. Unlike Welsh, however, the
Garner Court did not look to legislative classifications to determine relative
seriousness. Instead, the Court appealed to an intuitive violent–nonviolent
distinction.66
D. SUMMARY
As the preceding discussion reveals, the case law stands in a state of
confusion. The bulk of Fourth Amendment doctrine is transsubstantive,
either by virtue of the Supreme Court’s explicit rejection of crime severity as
a valid Fourth Amendment consideration, or the Court’s pointed omission
of that consideration from its analysis. To the extent the Court provides any
justification for this counterintuitive omission, it is that offense-severity
distinctions are unworkable in the Fourth Amendment context. This
explanation is belied by Welsh and Garner, where the Court explicitly, but
inconsistently and with little analysis, requires police officers and courts to
assess Fourth Amendment reasonableness, in part, by evaluating the
seriousness of the underlying offense.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 n.9 (2007) (citation omitted) (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at
11).
65. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
66. In at least two other contexts, the Supreme Court hinted, without deciding, that
offense severity might factor into Fourth Amendment reasonableness. See United States v.
Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37 n.4 (2003) (suggesting, without deciding, that there might be a
distinction with respect to reasonableness of no-knock entry “when the reason for the search is
a minor offense”); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 223–24, 229 (1985) (upholding
Terry stop of a person suspected of being the getaway driver in a twelve-day-old, armed robbery
as reasonable, “[p]articularly in the context of felonies or crimes involving a threat to public
safety,” but hedging that: “We need not and do not decide today whether Terry stops to
investigate all past crimes, however serious, are permitted”). In the wake of Hensley, lower courts
diverge on the question left open by the high court, with some courts deeming there to be a
rough dividing line between serious and minor crimes demarcated by the pertinent
jurisdiction’s (sometimes obscure) line between felony and misdemeanor offenses. See Rachel S.
Weiss, Note, Defining the Contours of United States v. Hensley: Limiting the Use of Terry Stops for
Completed Misdemeanors, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1321, 1335 & n.109 (2009). Lower courts also
incorporate offense seriousness into the reasonableness calculation in contexts not yet
condoned by the Supreme Court. See Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 615 (9th Cir. 1984)
(per curiam) (holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits suspicionless strip searches of
prisoners arrested “for minor offenses”), overruled by Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595
F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d
296, 299 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011) (noting Ninth Circuit’s reversal of
Giles and the circuit split with respect to reasonableness of suspicionless strip searches of
prisoners); Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte Blanche, 77
IND. L.J. 419, 461 & n.270.
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II. CALLS TO ALTER THE TRANSSUBSTANTIVE STATUS QUO
Given the intuitive appeal of incorporating offense gravity into Fourth
Amendment “reasonableness,” it is no surprise that there have long been
critics of transsubstantive Fourth Amendment doctrine. Justice Jackson
initiated this chorus in a 1949 case where the Supreme Court applied the
then-evolving “automobile exception”67 to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement. Unconvinced that Fourth Amendment protections should
hinge on the distinction between automobiles and homes, Justice Jackson
opined that “if we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
. . . it seems to me they should depend [instead] . . . upon the gravity of the
offense.”68 Justice Jackson argued that such distinctions would reflect that
judges should “strive hard[er] to sustain” a questionable search for a
kidnapped child than a similar search for a suspected “bootlegger.”69
Justice Jackson’s dissent foreshadowed a smattering of academic calls
for offense-severity-based distinctions in Fourth Amendment doctrine. In
one of the earliest, John Kaplan advocated an exception to the application
of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule “in the most serious cases.”70
Under this approach, Fourth Amendment protections remain unchanged,
but the remedy of exclusion applies only in prosecutions of less serious
crimes.71 Kaplan’s approach, by sending an indirect signal to police officers,
tracks modern suggestions that the courts should allow government agents
greater leeway in investigating particularly dangerous offenses, such as

67. See, e.g., United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1087 (10th Cir. 2009) (describing
the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement).
68. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
69. Id.; see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
70. Kaplan, supra note 12, at 1046 (proposing exception to the exclusionary rule “in the
most serious cases—treason, espionage, murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping by organized
groups” with the caveat “that evidence would be suppressed if the violation of civil liberties were
shocking enough”).
71. Kaplan argues that his proposal would protect the exclusionary rule from popular
hostility and allow courts to more “fully and honestly” interpret the Fourth Amendment,
“[f]reed of the concern that the fourth amendment [sic] doctrine they announce would later
result in the release of people guilty of the most serious crimes.” Id. at 1047. Yale Kamisar and
others criticize proposals like Kaplan’s on the ground that they lead inevitably to dilution of the
already meager Fourth Amendment protections, particularly as any list of “serious crimes”
would inevitably grow to include numerous offenses, including those that most frequently
occasion unreasonable searches—drug offenses. Yale Kamisar, “Comparative Reprehensibility” and
the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26 (1987) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Luna, supra note 53, at 782–87 (echoing and supplementing Kamisar’s criticisms of
“sliding scale approaches to the Fourth Amendment”); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9, § 3.1(c), at
132 (criticizing proposals to limit the reach of the exclusionary rule).

A1 - BELLIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

CRIME-SEVERITY DISTINCTIONS

9/30/20112:18 PM

19

terrorism.72 In fact, prior to federalization of the exclusionary rule in 1961,73
Maryland enacted an extreme form of the system that Kaplan would later
propose—providing that evidence obtained in an illegal search could be
admitted in any felony trial.74
More recently, commentators, including William Stuntz and Sheryl
Colb, advocate incorporating offense gravity directly into Fourth
Amendment reasonableness assessments.75 Stuntz suggests separating
offenses into discrete categories and crafting “more forgiving [Fourth
Amendment] rules for more serious crimes and tougher rules for less

72. Frase, supra note 21, at 417 (“It seems inevitable that the Court will be presented with
one or more cases in which the police request additional investigative authority to deal with
terrorism or other threats of catastrophic harm.”); Gould & Stern, supra note 53, at 778
(arguing that Fourth Amendment doctrine should be altered to ensure that law enforcement
may lawfully conduct a mass search to locate a hidden nuclear bomb); Stuntz, supra note 9, at
2141–42, 2188–89 (arguing that “there is nothing new about, and nothing wrong with, the
claim that after September 11 law enforcement authority should increase” and proposing as
part of a “grand trade” that law enforcement be provided additional constitutional leeway
investigating terrorists). Even with exclusion off the table, milder disincentives to
unconstitutional searches and seizures would presumably remain, such as civil liability under 28
U.S.C. § 1983. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242–43 (2009).
73. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in
the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 76–77 (1992) (explaining that, although the
exclusionary rule was introduced by the Supreme Court in the 1914 decision of Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), its application was limited to federal prosecutions until the 1961
decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
74. See Delnegro v. State, 81 A.2d 241, 244 (Md. 1951) (citing Bouse Act, ch. 194, § 1,
1929 Md. Laws 533, 533–34 (repealed 1996)). The Maryland statute was later amended to also
preclude application of the exclusionary rule in prosecutions of misdemeanor gambling
offenses in certain counties. Salsburg v. State, 94 A.2d 280, 281 (Md. 1953), aff’d, 346 U.S. 545
(1954).
75. See Colb, supra note 48, at 1642; Stuntz, supra note 8, at 870 (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness command implies a consideration of the “government need” for
certain investigative techniques, and “[a] large factor in government need—perhaps the
largest—is the crime the government is investigating”). Other commentators echo these calls
for offense-specific Fourth Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 12, at 802, 804
(arguing that Courts should be “fixed on reasonableness as the polestar of the Fourth
Amendment” and noting offense severity as one of the possible factors to be considered in
determining reasonableness); Arcila, supra note 33, at 1339 (suggesting series of guidelines for
Fourth Amendment doctrine that includes “proportionality,” a concept defined, in part, based
on “the degree of harm to be avoided or investigated”); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth
Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 53, 74 (advocating a cost–benefit analysis of searches to
determine constitutional reasonableness, enforced exclusively by tort remedies, and noting that
a factor in weighing the benefits of a search is the “gravity of the crime”). For example, Wesley
Oliver echoes Kaplan’s call for an exception to the exclusionary rule for serious crimes, but
calls on the legislature to define the crimes effected, and limits this exception to “good faith”
Fourth Amendment violations. Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Better Categorical Balance of the
Costs and Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 241, 246 (2005); see also
Schroeder, supra note 21, at 557–58 (advocating that a bright-line rule be established barring
warrantless home entries in investigations of all misdemeanor—as opposed to felony—offenses,
and also suggesting differential Fourth Amendment treatment for “apocalyptic” crimes).
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serious crimes.”76 Colb advocates, more generally, that courts should engage
in comprehensive Fourth Amendment balancing that includes a “weighing
of the gravity of the crime or crimes defined in the law being enforced,
against the invasiveness of the proposed government intrusion.”77
Unlike Kaplan’s approach which, as with any analogous tailoring of the
exclusionary rule, alters existing doctrine solely by easing limits on
prosecutions of serious crime, the reforms advocated by Colb and Stuntz
also enhance constitutional limits on investigations of minor crimes.78
Currently valid searches and seizures would become unconstitutional due, in
part, to the relative insignificance of the targeted offense.79 Given that
investigations of minor offenses such as traffic violations and drug possession
constitute a substantial portion of police–citizen interactions,80 limits on

76. Stuntz, supra note 8, at 870.
77. Colb, supra note 48, at 1647. Colb’s proposal “would result in a finding that the Court
either should or should not apply a substantively more demanding standard (or even, in theory,
an absolute prohibition) to such intrusions.” Id. Echoing the tenor of Colb’s view, Slobogin
proposes a doctrinal framework based upon the idea that “the justification for a government
search or seizure ought to be roughly proportionate to the invasiveness of the search or
seizure.” Slobogin, supra note 28, at 1588. Slobogin focuses only on one side of the
reasonableness balance, however, and particularly “an assessment of intrusiveness” of the
search, which, he argues, should be determined with reference to public opinion. Id. at 1594,
1608 (arguing that “crucial to application of the proportionality principle that I propose . . . is
an assessment of intrusiveness;” “the government’s justification for a search or seizure must be
roughly proportionate to its intrusiveness, and . . . the justification inquiry focuses on how
certain police are about whether the search or seizure will produce the evidence they seek”); see
also CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT 39 (2007) (discussing the government-interest side of the equation with
reference to the degree of certainty that a suspect committed a crime).
78. See Frase, supra note 21, at 417 (emphasizing that offense-specific Fourth Amendment
doctrine should not be a “one way street” (quoting Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 465
(1974) (internal quotation mark omitted)), and if Courts grant police greater authority to
investigate serious crimes they “will face increased pressure to impose additional limitations on
police powers in very minor cases”). As part of a proposed “grand trade,” Stuntz also advocates a
crime-conscious Fourth Amendment doctrine that attempts to limit certain types of secret,
invasive searches to “the investigation of violent felonies” by “bar[ring] the use of . . . evidence”
obtained in those searches “to prove other, lesser crimes.” Stuntz, supra note 9, at 2184. This
proposal appears, like Kaplan’s, to focus on the charged crime, rather than the crime under
investigation.
79. Colb, supra note 48, at 1645 (emphasizing the ability of proposed approach to
improve upon current doctrine by “address[ing] the potential for disproportionality between
searches otherwise supported by probable cause and a warrant when the crime at issue is
relatively minor”); Frase, supra note 21, at 394 (“In very minor cases, the proportionality
principle can operate as a trump, as it did in Welsh v. Wisconsin.”).
80. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2005, at 3 tbl.3 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf (reporting on survey indicating that 40.9% of police–
citizen contacts involved a stop of respondent for a traffic infraction, while 2.8% arose because
the person was suspected of other wrongdoing by police); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 204, 206 tbls.320 & 324 (2011) (listing arrest
offenses in 2008, including 430.4 drug-possession arrests per every 100,000 U.S. inhabitants);
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police conduct in such investigations would result in fewer searches and
seizures, and many of those spared would be poor or members of racial
minorities.81 These proposals resonate with criticisms of Atwater and Whren as
insensitive both to the constitutional command that searches and seizures be
“reasonable,” and to modern concerns about racial profiling, police
coercion, and community resentment.82
The most striking aspect of the literature analyzing the omission of
crime severity from Fourth Amendment balancing, however, is how little
exists.83 Moreover, the few commentators who squarely address the subject
sketch in exceedingly broad strokes, ultimately failing to address the
Supreme Court’s administrability concern.84 And this, after all, is the most
challenging aspect of the problem. As Eugene Volokh explains,

Bureau of Justice Statistics, Dep’t of Justice, Key Facts at a Glance, OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/drugtab.cfm (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) (reporting
1,645,500 drug arrests for adults and 195,700 for juveniles in 2007).
81. See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, RACIAL DISPARITY IN NYPD STOPS-AND-FRISKS
3–5 (2009), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/reports/Report_CCR_NYPD_Stop_and_
Frisk.pdf (describing disproportionate impact of NYPD stop-and-frisk policy on minorities);
DUROSE ET AL., supra note 80, at 3 tbl.5 (noting race of individuals stopped for traffic
violations); Frase, supra note 21, at 333 (arguing that in the wake of decisions like Atwater, “the
extremely broad arrest and search powers now enjoyed by the police will be applied in a highly
selective manner, thus virtually ensuring even more frequent complaints of racial profiling and
other forms of disparity”); Stuntz, supra note 8, at 854–55, 871–75 (arguing that crime-severity
distinctions would reduce the likelihood of discriminatory law enforcement because broad
substantive criminal law, such as the traffic code, gives police “probable cause to arrest anyone
they want[]”); Ailsa Chang, Alleged Illegal Searches by NYPD May Be Increasing Marijuana Arrests,
WNYC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2011/apr/26/
marijuana-arrests (reporting on high volume of marijuana possession arrests—140 people a
day—in New York City and suggesting that aggressive police enforcement of marijuana
possession laws disproportionately result in searches of minorities).
82. Atwater and Whren have been harshly criticized. See, e.g., Diana Roberto Donahoe,
“Could Have,” “Would Have:” What the Supreme Court Should Have Decided in Whren v. United
States, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1193, 1205 (1997) (noting that given the ubiquity of traffic laws
and the Supreme Court’s holding in Whren, “[n]o one is free from this abuse of discretion”);
Frase, supra note 21, at 331 (“The decision in Atwater has been widely criticized, even by
conservatives, and with good reason.” (footnote omitted)); Logan, supra note 66, at 465–66
(arguing that Atwater suggests that “reasonableness has been written out of the Fourth
Amendment” and ignores the implications for “all Americans, who, in contrast to members of
the Atwater majority, . . . will suffer the brunt of the Court’s cavalier sentiment”); Timothy P.
O’Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Probable Cause, Beyond the Fourth Amendment: New Strategies for
Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 693, 730 (1998) (arguing that “Whren is a serious
setback for those interested in the civil liberties of Americans”).
83. See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 851 (noting that Fourth Amendment doctrine’s
transsubstantive nature “is almost never questioned”).
84. See Volokh, supra note 10, at 1961 (“Surprisingly, few works have so far discussed this
matter broadly and systematically.”). Schroeder’s proposal for coherently applying Welsh, supra
note 21, and Oliver’s argument for a limited good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in
serious cases, supra note 75, are notable exceptions, but both focus on narrow aspects of Fourth
Amendment doctrine.
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The value of constitutional severity distinctions in the abstract
should not be the issue. Here the devil is in the details. If courts
can’t make the severity distinctions work in practice, then the
distinctions’ merits in principle are of little consequence. And if
courts can make the distinctions work in practice, then we might be
able to live with the distinctions’ theoretical problems.85
In the end, the existing literature concerning Fourth Amendment
doctrine’s treatment of crime severity constitutes a fascinating, but
incomplete and unsatisfying, dialogue. Compelling reasons for
incorporating crime severity into Fourth Amendment reasonableness coexist
with compelling, but unaddressed, objections to that course. Particularly as
crime severity may hold the key to the meaningful application of the Fourth
Amendment in the modern era, the stagnation of this debate is unfortunate.
It is long past time for a robust discussion of the specifics of incorporating
crime severity into Fourth Amendment doctrine, or a frank
acknowledgement from scholars that no workable mechanism for doing so
exists.
III. INCORPORATING CRIME SEVERITY INTO FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
For all its intuitive appeal, incorporating crime-severity distinctions into
Fourth Amendment doctrine is a challenging endeavor. First, any changes to
existing doctrine must be amenable to practical application not only by
lower courts, but also by police officers acting quickly in ambiguous and
sometimes lethal circumstances. Second, the changes must be supported not
simply by normative arguments, but by principles of constitutional
interpretation.86 Guided by these considerations, this Part suggests a novel

85. Volokh, supra note 10, at 1983; see also Schroeder, supra note 21, at 558 (recognizing
“the difficulties inherent in finding a viable methodology for distinguishing among and ranking
offenses”).
86. On this second point, the Fourth Amendment’s text is both a blessing and a curse.
The “reasonableness” command openly invites consideration of a crime-severity variable in
some form. In addition, the vague constitutional directive provides significant leeway to the
Supreme Court to define the variable’s contours and should immunize the Court to some
degree from criticism—at least on constitutional legitimacy grounds—of the choices made. See
Steiker, supra note 33, at 824 (noting that the Fourth Amendment “appears to require a fairly
high level of abstraction of purpose; its use of the term ‘reasonable’ (actually, ‘unreasonable’)
positively invites constructions that change with changing circumstances”); Volokh, supra note
10, at 1977 (“Perhaps so long as there is a constitutional principle that shows the need to draw
a line somewhere, courts should feel free to draw such a line even if they can’t give a principled
reason for the particular place they draw it.”); cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160
(1968) (noting difficulty of line drawing in separating “petty offenses” from those for which a
jury trial must be provided and stating that “in the absence of an explicit constitutional
provision, the definitional task necessarily falls on the courts”). At the same time, the absence of
a more specific constitutional command creates a danger that no matter what course the Court
pursues, it will appear to be acting on its own policy preferences, particularly if its crime-severity
characterizations do not mirror those of the legislature. See Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth
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analytical and interpretive approach to crafting a Fourth Amendment crimeseverity framework.
A. IDENTIFYING THE RELEVANT CRIME
Any framework that incorporates crime-severity distinctions into Fourth
Amendment doctrine requires a threshold mechanism for precisely
identifying the crime at issue. While often overlooked in the debate over
constitutional crime-severity distinctions, identifying the relevant crime can
sometimes be just as difficult as determining its relative severity.
The first question in this analysis is whether to focus on the crime being
investigated at the time of the stop and search, or the crime ultimately
charged. The two offenses are often distinct, and the divergence can be
extreme.87 If the analysis is, as here, driven by the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness command, the answer is clear. An assessment of the
reasonableness of an officer’s search or seizure depends on the information
available to the officer at the time of its initiation.88 Thus, it must be the
offense suspected or under investigation that informs the Fourth
Amendment calculus, not the offense ultimately charged (something that
will often be unknown at the initiation of a search or seizure).89 This
conclusion appears consistent with the Supreme Court’s truncated forays

Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition: Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line
Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 341 (2004) (highlighting the difficulty the “spacious” language of the
Fourth Amendment creates for courts: “courts are not supposed to legislate, and yet in this
instance the plain meaning of the text incorporates norms of reasonableness by reference”).
87. For example, Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh and serial killer Ted Bundy
were apprehended after being pulled over for traffic violations. See Official Trial Transcript,
United States v. McVeigh, 1997 WL 203457, at *12 & *32 (D. Colo. 1997); David A. Sklansky,
Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271,
271 n.1.
88. See, e.g., Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261–62 (1960) (holding that
constitutionality of arrest must be determined by what occurred at the time of arrest, and
“nothing that happened thereafter could make that arrest lawful, or justify a search as its
incident”); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (“We have had frequent occasion
to point out that a search is not to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad
when it starts and does not change character from its success.” (citation omitted)).
89. See Colb, supra note 48, at 1645 (advocating that “Supreme Court doctrine recognize
that an ‘unreasonable’ search in violation of the Fourth Amendment occurs whenever the
intrusiveness of a search outweighs the gravity of the offense being investigated”); Donald A.
Dripps, The “New” Exclusionary Rule Debate: From “Still Preoccupied with 1985” to “Virtual Deterrence,”
37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 743, 760 (2010) (“However one resolves the transsubstantive issue, the
issue is one of substantive, rather than remedial, law.”); Stuntz, supra note 8, at 851 (“Fourth
Amendment law can vary its protection based on the nature of the crime police are
investigating.”). This is not to say that crime-severity distinctions tethered to the charged crime
would be unsupportable. Rather, the point is that an approach that focused on the charged
crime is distinct from that proposed here, requiring a different doctrinal grounding (e.g.,
policy-based modifications to the exclusionary rule) and aimed at a different goal—removing
obstacles to prosecutions of serious crimes. The merits of such a proposal would require careful
consideration and are beyond the scope of this Article.
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into Fourth Amendment crime-severity distinctions in both Welsh and
Garner.90
The conclusion that the offense under investigation constitutes the
relevant crime does not end the analysis. Uncertainty as to the crime being
investigated will often arise from factual ambiguity in the initial report of a
crime.91 In addition, once crime severity matters to the constitutional
inquiry, officers could artificially buttress the constitutional reasonableness
of their actions by overstating the offense under investigation.92 As in other
areas of Fourth Amendment doctrine, an objective standard can address the
related concerns of ambiguity and manipulation.93 A Fourth Amendment
crime-severity variable need not be determined by an officer’s subjective
state of mind, or influenced by after-the-fact rationalizations. Rather, courts
could adopt an objective, yet deferential,94 test that focuses on the facts
known to law enforcement at the time of a search or seizure, much like the
probable-cause standard under existing law.95 Such a standard (e.g., “the
most serious offense plausibly suggested by the facts known to the officer”)96
would lend itself to common-sense application, even in ambiguous
90. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (determining that the offense the
officer believed the suspect had committed was not sufficiently dangerous to warrant seizure by
deadly force); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984) (deeming “the underlying offense
for which there is probable cause to arrest” to be minor); cf. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S.
221, 229 (1985) (noting possible distinction in reasonableness between stops based on officer’s
belief that suspect was involved in felony as opposed to misdemeanor offense).
91. See Slobogin, supra note 23, at 31–32 n.109; Stuntz, supra note 8, at 870 (noting that
gradations of protections will create the difficult circumstance where the police and prosecutors
must “classify cases by crime before the details of the crime are known”).
92. Cf. Steiker, supra note 33, at 853 (noting that under current law, “once police officers
have found incriminating evidence, they have an obvious incentive to perjure themselves in
order to justify the initial seizure”).
93. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (2011); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 397 (1989) (“As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, . . . the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry
. . . is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’
in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying
intent or motivation.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (emphasizing that in assessing
Fourth Amendment reasonableness, “it is imperative that the facts be judged against an
objective standard”).
94. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1859; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97 (“The calculus of reasonableness
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving . . . .”).
95. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9, § 3.3(b), at 166 (explaining that the “probable cause
test” is “an objective one; for there to be probable cause, the facts must be such as would
warrant a belief by a reasonable man”). Where appropriate, the “collective knowledge” doctrine
imputes the knowledge of other officers to the searching officer. See United States v. Nafzger,
974 F.2d 906, 912 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing collective-knowledge doctrine).
96. Cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (holding that deadly force seizures are
reasonable where “there is probable cause to believe that [the suspect] has committed a crime
involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm”); Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984) (holding that a warrantless home entry was unreasonable where “the
underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest” was minor).
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circumstances, and counteracts any incentive to speculate as to the existence
of a more serious crime than the facts support.
B. THE CASE AGAINST CASE-SPECIFIC SEVERITY DETERMINATIONS
After identifying the relevant crime, a doctrinal framework that
incorporates crime-severity distinctions must confront its next significant
challenge—determining the relative seriousness of that crime. The difficulty
inherent in crafting a workable crime hierarchy is one of the most
commonly cited reasons for rejecting Fourth Amendment crime-severity
distinctions.97
A tempting response to the difficulty of categorizing offenses is to avoid
the enterprise altogether, leaving lower courts to make ad hoc, case-by-case
assessments of offense severity. This is essentially the approach adopted by
the majority in Welsh,98 with predictable results. Surveying the post-Welsh case
law, William Schroeder characterizes the lower courts’ crime-severity analysis
as “arbitrary, freewheeling, and reflective of little more than the intuitive
reactions of individual judges to particular crimes.”99 The lower courts
engage “in a process of characterization rather than classification and have
simply characterized particular offenses as ‘grave,’ ‘serious,’ or ‘minor.’”100
Examples of the phenomenon Schroeder identifies abound. In Ingram
v. City of Columbus, the Sixth Circuit characterized as a serious offense a
defendant’s taking of an undercover narcotics officer’s twenty dollars and
fleeing into a home.101 In United States v. Schmidt, the Eighth Circuit took a
similarly dim view of a teenager’s actions during an attempted arrest (on the
teenager’s lawn) for underage drinking.102The teenager, insisting that the
officer had no right to be on his property, kicked the officer in the knee and
fled into his house.103 The Court concluded that the officer’s “hot pursuit”
home entry (the officer followed the suspect and kicked in his locked front
door) was reasonable because “[t]he underlying offense here, assault with a
dangerous weapon” (the teenager’s shoe) “is certainly a serious offense.”104

97. See Schroeder, supra note 21, at 498; Slobogin, supra note 23, at 31 n.109; Volokh,
supra note 10, at 1982; supra Part I.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s rejection of offenseseverity distinctions); cf. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 76 (1985) (“Rating crimes is ultimately a
matter of making value judgments, on which persons reasonably may differ.”).
98. See supra Part I.C.
99. Schroeder, supra note 21, at 497 (citing cases).
100. Id. at 494.
101. Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587–88 (6th Cir. 1999) (ruling that the
police had probable cause to believe the suspect was “engaged in a felony warranting
imprisonment”—offering to sell cocaine—and, thus, could pursue him into a home without a
warrant).
102. United States v. Schmidt, 403 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2005).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1013.
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The Supreme Court itself engaged in this type of vacuous analysis when
confronted with a case that appeared analogous to Welsh. In Illinois v.
McArthur, the Court considered whether the police, suspecting that a man
had a small amount of marijuana in his trailer home, reasonably barred his
entry while they obtained a search warrant.105 The Court found no Fourth
Amendment violation and dismissed comparison to Welsh, in part, on the
ground that unlike the “minor” offense in Welsh, possession of marijuana (a
class C misdemeanor under state law) was “‘jailable,’ not ‘nonjailable.’”106
The post-Welsh jurisprudence summarized above highlights two
significant problems with case-by-case offense characterization.107 First, such
ad-hoc characterization is anathema to the principle that Fourth
Amendment doctrine must be sufficiently concrete that law-enforcement
officers (and citizens) can predict, in advance, whether a given search or
seizure is constitutional.108 Second, when looking only at individual cases,
courts can find almost any offense, in isolation, “serious.”109 This predictable
reflex misses the point of offense-severity considerations—relative severity.
The question is not whether a particular crime is serious. (We are, after all,
talking about criminal laws.) Rather, the pertinent question is whether
certain crimes are more or less serious than others, thus necessitating, under
a reasonableness standard, a more or less intrusive police response.
C. CRAFTING A CRIME HIERARCHY
The lower courts’ experience implementing Welsh suggests that it is not
sufficient to leave offense-severity classification to ad-hoc, case-by-case
judicial assessments. Guideposts must be erected to ensure predictability for
citizens and police officers, create consistency throughout the lower courts,
and decrease the temptation to reflexively label all criminal offenses
“serious.” In short, a workable Fourth Amendment framework that
incorporates offense severity must categorize offenses.
105. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 328 (2001).
106. Id. at 336. The offense could be punished by up to thirty days in jail. Id.
107. See Volokh, supra note 10, at 1977–79 (highlighting similar difficulties with a doctrinal
framework that evaluates crime severity on a case-by-case basis). The debate summarized above
reflects the familiar tensions between rules and standards. See generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985).
108. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (“[T]he protection of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments ‘can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules
which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to
whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.’”), abrogated on
other grounds by Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
109. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 97, at 74 (“An explicit seriousness scale helps compel the
rulemaker to consider whether its proposed penalties comport with its judgment of the
comparative gravity of offenses.”); Kamisar, supra note 71, at 26 (emphasizing inevitable
pressure on courts to expand any list defining “serious crimes” for which law enforcement was
permitted greater leeway in its investigations); Luna, supra note 53, at 782–87 (echoing and
supplementing Kamisar’s criticisms).
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In theory, the greater the number of categories, the more precision that
can be obtained in assessing reasonableness. Yet the success of any
categorization scheme may depend on resisting this sentiment for three
reasons. The first is complexity. As the pertinent categories become
increasingly refined, police officers and courts will experience greater
difficulty determining where particular offenses fall. Second, more
categories means more disagreement as to the placement of particular
offenses and greater inconsistency among courts, factors that would
jeopardize the critical constitutional connection between crime severity and
a socially shared conception of “reasonableness.” Indeed, in the Eighth
Amendment context, the Supreme Court, while insisting on its competence
to draw crime-severity distinctions “on a broad scale,” acknowledges that this
capability quickly becomes strained as distinctions become more precise.110
Third, and perhaps most important, there are only so many Fourth
Amendment standards that courts can verbalize and apply. Review of a
challenged search is not mathematics, and subtle distinctions between more
than, say, three gradations of offenses would require great effort to achieve
only illusory precision.111 Thus, at least until a need appears for more
nuanced categorization, three categories should suffice: “grave,” “serious,”
and “minor” crimes.
As for placing crimes in each category, it is critical that courts avoid the
temptation to defer to legislative classifications. As discussed below,
deferring to the legislature, while quite sensible in many contexts, makes
little sense as a means of construing Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
The primary evil that the drafters of the Fourth Amendment sought to
eliminate was the general warrant—often a creature of legislation.112 The
Supreme Court, thus, recognizes in related contexts the absurdity of

110. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292–94 (1983) (explaining that “courts are
competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative scale” because “there are
generally accepted criteria for comparing the severity of different crimes on a broad scale,
despite the difficulties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between similar crimes”).
111. This point distinguishes the related challenge of calculating offense seriousness for
purposes of sentencing. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS
GUIDELINES 99 (1987) (deeming “sensible” the Minnesota Sentencing Commission’s decision
to distinguish ten categories of offense seriousness). As the federal sentencing guidelines
demonstrate, sentences can be calculated in precise numerical increments. See generally U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
guidelines/2010_guidelines/Manual_PDF/TitlePage_Citation_ToC.pdf.
112. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 362 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Statutes
authorizing unreasonable searches were the core concern of the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment.”); CUDDIHY, supra note 22, at 151–61, 469–76 (describing vast body of English
legislation that authorized searches pursuant to general warrants); Davies, supra note 22, at 583,
590 (stating that “[n]o one questions that the Framers despised and sought to ban general
warrants” and explaining that “the Framers adopted constitutional search and seizure
provisions with the precise aim of ensuring the protection of person and house by prohibiting
legislative approval of general warrants”).
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deeming a search or seizure performed by the executive branch either
reasonable or unreasonable by reference to the opinion of the legislative
branch. Writing for eight Justices in Virginia v. Moore, Justice Scalia noted
that there is “no historical indication that those who ratified the Fourth
Amendment understood it as a redundant guarantee of whatever limits on
search and seizure legislatures might have enacted.”113 Instead, the
Amendment embodies the sentiment that “founding-era citizens were
skeptical of using the rules for search and seizure set by government actors
as the index of reasonableness.”114
Further, the Supreme Court often emphasizes the need to avoid
“linking Fourth Amendment protections to state law”—the law that would
most commonly be called upon, as in Welsh, to define offense severity.115
Doing so would result in constitutional rules that “vary from place to place
and from time to time.”116 Finally, expanding on this last thought (“time to
time”), any offense-severity categorization that depends on legislative
classification would be vulnerable to manipulation. Legislatures could alter
the relevant classifications to increase police officers’ investigative authority,
causing a search or seizure that was unreasonable one day to be reasonable
the next.117
As tempting as it may be, then, deferring to legislative classification is
not the answer. Instead, for practical reasons and as a matter of
constitutional interpretation, crime severity must, like other aspects of
Fourth Amendment doctrine, be measured objectively, by a judge
channeling the views of a hypothetical reasonable person.118 Canadian
113. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008); see also Davies, Post-Framing Adoption,
supra note 33, at 24 & n.96.
114. Moore, 553 U.S. at 169.
115. Id. at 176.
116. Id. (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
117. See Colb, supra note 48, at 1683 (criticizing Welsh for “disavow[ing] any judicial
judgment about the significance of the actual violation” and warning that “[i]f Wisconsin were
unhappy with the Court’s decision, it could, therefore, nullify it prospectively by simply
changing (legislatively) the status of driving while intoxicated from a civil violation to a criminal
offense”); Schroeder, supra note 21, at 499 (noting that the Fourth Amendment should “not
[be] subject to arbitrary change or manipulation by legislatures or courts”); Volokh, supra note
10, at 1974 (recognizing danger of legislative manipulation in this context). A further problem
is that legislative assignments of maximum sentences may not be indicative even of the
legislature’s view of the seriousness of the crime. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 763
(1984) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the legislature may have limited “the penalties
imposed on first offenders in order to increase the ease of conviction and the overall deterrent
effect”); VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 111, at 100 (recognizing that statutory penalties may be
influenced by “considerations other than seriousness”).
118. Reasonable-person standards are common in Fourth Amendment doctrine. See, e.g.,
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007) (“[A] seizure occurs if ‘in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave’ . . . .” (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)); Florida v.
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jurisprudence relies on a reasonable-person standard in an analogous
circumstance of determining whether evidence obtained in a questionable
manner must be excluded at trial to avoid “bring[ing] the administration of
justice into disrepute.”119 In this context, Canadian Supreme Court Justice
Lamer explains, “[t]he reasonable person is usually the average person in
the community, but only when that community’s current mood is
reasonable.”120 Thus, the reasonable-person standard is “not left to the
untrammeled discretion of the judge” or the vagaries of public opinion but
is a judicial determination “grounded in community values and, in
particular, long term community values.”121 This exercise of drawing upon
community norms to apply an objective reasonableness standard should
look familiar. It is, in essence, the same analytical exercise the United States
Supreme Court undertakes in determining whether a search has occurred in
the first place under the venerable “reasonable expectation of privacy”
test.122
Reliance on a reasonable-person standard in the crime-severity context
draws strength from the broad societal consensus as to the most serious and
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s
consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness-what would the
typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the
suspect?”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (identifying as key Fourth Amendment inquiry:
“would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate”).
119. R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, para. 20 (Can.).
120. Id. at para. 33; see also Morissette, supra note 31, at 538 (elaborating on the benefits of
the “reasonable man” standard in Canadian jurisprudence). Canadian jurisprudence has a
complicated history with respect to considering crime severity in this analysis. See Collins, 1
S.C.R. 265, at para. 35 (recognizing as a pertinent factor: “[I]s the offence serious?”); R. v.
Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, paras. 62, 66, 84 (Can.) (expressing dissatisfaction with the case
law that had evolved under Collins and, in the process of providing “clarification” as to multifactored approach, ruling that offense seriousness “cut both ways” and was thus always a neutral
factor in the exclusionary calculus).
121. Collins, 1 S.C.R. 265, at para. 34. A similar approach could be to view relative crime
severity through a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance,” where those who craft a crime hierarchy must
do so without knowing its implications for their personal interests. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Cf. Robert Weisberg, IVHS, Legal Privacy, and the Legacy of Dr.
Faustus, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 75, 78 (1995) (“[T]o return Fourth
Amendment law—or supplementary statute law—to what philosophers call the Rawlsian veil of
ignorance—that idealized condition in which we convene to establish the best rules for our
society before anyone of us knows whether she personally will turn out to be the beneficiary or
the victim of the rules.”).
122. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (“[I]n order to claim the protection of
the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation
of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable; i.e., one that has ‘a
source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal
property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.’” (quoting Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–44 & n.12 (1978) (emphasis added)); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 740 (1979) (explaining that a search occurs when the authorities invade an expectation of
privacy that “society is prepared to recognize” as reasonable).
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most trivial offenses. While views as to absolute severity vary among social
groups, social-science literature points to “the existence of wide general
agreement and stability across different social sectors and population groups
with regard to the relative seriousness of behaviors considered to be
criminal.”123 Paul Robinson and Robert Kurzban recently surveyed this
literature, remarking on the “extraordinary extent of agreement across a
variety of issues and demographics,” with various methodological
approaches yielding conclusions that “are all essentially the same,
confirming the existence of shared intuitions as to relative seriousness of
different variations on wrongdoing.”124 The Supreme Court already
recognizes the salience of this literature as an aid to assessing relative crime
severity in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.125
In the social-science literature, the crimes engendering “wide general
agreement” as among the most severe involve “traditional common lawbased criminal acts such as ‘a parent beats his young child to death,’
‘planned killing of a person for a fee,’ ‘forcible rape of a neighbor,’ and
‘armed robbery of a bank.’”126 Analogous crimes identified as most serious
in public surveys include aggravated assaults, stranger kidnappings, and
other armed robberies.127 Absent some reasoned basis to reject the societal

123. Sergio Herzog, The Relationship Between Public Perceptions of Crime Seriousness and Support
for Plea-Bargaining Practices in Israel: A Factorial-Survey Approach, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
103, 106–07 (2003) (summarizing literature); see VON HIRSCH, supra note 97, at 65 (explaining
that, while there is continuing debate on this point, the existing “studies show that people from
different walks of life tend to rate the gravity of common criminal acts similarly”); Michael
O’Connell & Anthony Whelan, Taking Wrongs Seriously: Public Perceptions of Crime Seriousness, 36
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 299, 301 (1996) (surveying literature and concluding that “[t]here
appears to be agreement on consensus” that is “best stated by [P.H.] Rossi and [P.H.] Henry” as
follows: “Remarkable degrees of consensus obtain . . . across populations within sub-groups [but
the] . . . agreement on the relative ordering of criminal acts is compatible with considerable
differences in the absolute level of seriousness attributed to any given act”). Similarly, H.L.A.
Hart refers to a “commonsense scale of gravity” in describing the need for a rational criminal
justice system to assign proportional punishments for varying offenses. H.L.A. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 25 (1968).
124. Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91
MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1855 (2007).
125. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292–94 (1983) (supporting assertion that “courts are
competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative scale,” by noting socialscience literature that suggests “there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness of
crimes” (citing Peter H. Rossi et al., The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual
Differences, 39 AM. SOC. REV. 224, 237 (1974))).
126. Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime To Tear the Tag off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the
Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1565 (1997) (discussing MARVIN E.
WOLFGANG ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SURVEY OF
CRIME SEVERITY (1985)).
127. See WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 126, at 49–50 (listing kidnapping, intentional
shootings, and armed robberies among offenses perceived to be most serious in comprehensive
survey of offense severity). The phrase “armed robbery” is intended to avoid inclusion of less
dangerous, unarmed robberies. See Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Crime Is Not the
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consensus with respect to the severity of these crimes, courts could identify
these offenses (and other directly analogous crimes) as forming the core of
a category of offenses that a reasonable person would deem most severe. As
the social-science literature indicates, people in all strata of American society
fear these offenses above all others and, presumably, expect police to
respond most aggressively to catch those who would commit them.128
Problem: A Reply, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1177, 1184 (1998) (“[R]obbery is both itself a violent
crime and one leading cause of criminal homicide.”).
128. See Delbert S. Elliott, Life-Threatening Violence Is Primarily a Crime Problem: A Focus on
Prevention, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (1998) (noting that when considering lifethreatening violent crime, “[t]he most inclusive definition would include all homicides,
nonnegligent manslaughters, robberies, and aggravated assaults”). For a discussion of the
complexities of developing theoretical grounds for ranking offense severity, see Andrew von
Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, in 16 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF
RESEARCH 81–83 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992). Elsewhere, von Hirsch suggests a theoretical basis
for determining offense severity based on the degree to which offenses “restrict people’s ability
to direct the course of their own lives,” a theory that “accounts for our sense of the gravity of
violence, for violence restricts victims’ choices so drastically” and explains “why economic
crimes can also be serious.” VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 111, at 101. He also argues,
consistent with the discussion in the text, that popular assessments of offense severity alone
should not determine offense seriousness, but such judgments “need to be supported by
reasons.” Id. at 100.
See WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 126, at 47–50 (chart). A team headed by Paul Robinson
recently surveyed residents of New Jersey and Pennsylvania to evaluate offense grading. See Paul
H. Robinson et al., Report on Offense Grading in New Jersey (Jan. 10, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737825 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11-03); Paul H. Robinson et al., Report on Offense Grading
in Pennsylvania (Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1527149 (Univ. of Pa.
Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 10-01). The
surveys, although not tailored to the Fourth Amendment inquiry, are consistent with the socialscience literature described above. In the Pennsylvania survey, the offenses rated above 5.5 on a
relative severity scale were murder, arson, keeping an adult slave, threatening a judge at
gunpoint in retaliation for a ruling, various sex offenses, selling an infant, rape of a minor,
shooting a firearm into a structure for purposes of ethnic intimidation, and threatening a
witness at gunpoint in retaliation for testifying. Robinson, Report on Offense Grading in
Pennsylvania, supra, at 58–62. The offenses rated below 2.0 included various nonviolent
offenses, such as failing to disperse, fraud, and trespassing (there do not appear to have been
any survey questions evaluating drug possession or traffic offenses). Id. In the New Jersey survey,
the offenses rated above 5.5 were arson, kidnapping, and other violent crimes, as well as the
somewhat esoteric offenses of unlawful importation of radioactive material and the unlawful
sale of cows with “mad cow” disease. Robinson, Report on Offense Grading in New Jersey, supra,
at 44–49. Offenses rated below 2.0 included obscenity offenses and possession or use of
marijuana. Id. Interpretation is complicated by the understandable use of narratives in place of
offense definitions. See id. at 16 & n.123; Robinson, Report on Offense Grading in
Pennsylvania, supra, at 10–11. In some of the narratives, the measured offense is paired with a
second offense, and it is likely that survey participants rated the severity of the combined
offense. See, e.g., id. at 49, 61 (evaluating severity of “unlawful use of body vests” through
narrative: “John illegally wears a bullet-proof vest during an attempt to kill his neighbor”).
Canadian authorities undertook another recent effort to determine relative crime severity
by reviewing the actual sentences given to offenders in Canadian courts. The results track the
surveys described above. See CANADIAN CENTRE FOR JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATISTICS CANADA,
MEASURING CRIME IN CANADA: INTRODUCING THE CRIME SEVERITY INDEX AND IMPROVEMENTS TO
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This description of crimes a reasonable person would deem most
serious neatly parallels Garner’s holding, delimiting the circumstances when
it is constitutionally reasonable to “seize” a fleeing suspect with deadly force.
The Garner Court states that deadly force (and thus the most intrusive type
of seizure) is reasonable if the suspect threatens an officer with a weapon “or
there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving
the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.”129 Garner,
thus, provides doctrinal support for the principle at the core of this Article:
As a matter of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, crimes involving the
threat of serious physical harm warrant more intrusive government
responses than crimes that do not.130 In fact, Garner suggests a workable
shorthand for the category of “grave” offenses: offenses involving the intentional
infliction, or threatened infliction, of serious physical harm.
Viewing relative crime severity through the eyes of a reasonable person
can also generate a category of “minor” offenses. These crimes parallel what
Margaret Raymond calls “penumbral crime,” crimes “defined by a high level
of noncompliance with the stated legal standard, an absence of stigma
associated with violation of the stated standard, and a low level of law
enforcement or public sanction.”131 Examples of crimes fitting this
description—essentially, laws that are commonly violated with little lasting
harm to anyone but, arguably, the violator—can again be identified with the
assistance of crime-perception surveys. The most comprehensive survey lists
the following crimes as least serious: truancy, vagrancy, illegal gambling,
trespassing, public drunkenness, noise disturbances, drug possession, simple
assault, petty theft, and prostitution.132 Reasoning by analogy from these
offenses reveals other crimes that should be included in the “minor” offense
category, such as jaywalking, riding a bicycle on the sidewalk,133 and routine
traffic and regulatory offenses. Again, absent some reasoned basis for
recategorization, the listed offenses would form the core of the “minor
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING SURVEY (2009), available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85004-x/85-004-x2009001-eng.pdf.
129. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
130. See Schroeder, supra note 21, at 528–29 (recognizing potential merits of crime-severity
distinctions that relate to the presence or absence of violence and recognizing that Garner
supports such an approach); cf. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (suggesting
that Terry stops might be more reasonable when conducted as part of investigations of “felonies
or crimes involving a threat to public safety”); 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (mandating
harsher penalties for offenders with prior violent felonies, defined as a felony that “has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another”).
131. Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1395 (2002).
132. See WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 126, at 47 (chart).
133. A surprising number of cases involve police contact based on violations of bicycle
ordinances. See, e.g., United States v. McFadden, 238 F.3d 198, 204 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting a
challenge to seizure by police who observed defendant riding a bicycle on the sidewalk, even
though pertinent New York statute contained numerous exceptions).
THE

A1 - BELLIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

CRIME-SEVERITY DISTINCTIONS

9/30/20112:18 PM

33

offense” category, with the inclusion of other analogous offenses resulting
from a filtering of public sentiment through the prism of objective
reasonableness—a judicial exercise that joins reasoned distinctions as to
crime severity with widely shared community values.134
Crafting a category of the most serious offenses and a category of the
least serious crimes results in a de facto residual category of crimes of
moderate severity, which can be labeled “serious,” but not “grave.”
Representative crimes include selling drugs, drunk driving, embezzlement,
and money laundering.135 In the three-tiered categorization scheme set forth
above, this middle category functions as a “demilitarized zone,” providing a
buffer between the “grave” and “minor” crimes that will minimize
disagreement and confusion as to the proper placement of offenses. Only
crimes that are particularly distinguished either as “minor” or “grave” would
escape categorization as “serious,” and investigations of crimes falling into
this broad “serious” category would be treated as they always have for Fourth
Amendment purposes.
It would be folly, at an early stage in the doctrine’s development (i.e., as
here, stage zero), to attempt to place every crime in a category. Rather, each
of the three categories sketched above should be filled out by judicial
decisions until the wide swath of crimes now in existence are categorized. A
robust series of examples along with principles that enable broad
categorization, as postulated above, would enable courts to categorize by
analogy until judicial consensus is reached as to most extant crimes. It is
worth emphasizing on this point that while penal codes contain a dazzling
number of crimes, most police officers spend the bulk of their time
investigating a small subset of these crimes that, due to their ubiquity, would
quickly be categorized by judicial decision.136

134. See R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, para. 33 (Can.). Popular survey data, while
informative, should not be dispositive. See VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 111, at 100 (arguing,
in the sentencing context, that popular assessments of offense severity alone should not
determine offense seriousness, but such judgments “need to be supported by reasons”).
135. Some crimes will fall into this middle category due to the absence of a societal
consensus as to their relative severity. Robinson and Kurzban found less agreement when they
tested subjects’ views of the relative seriousness of drug offenses, prostitution, and bestiality. See
Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 124, at 1890–91. The lack of agreement in the study could be
an artifact of its design. See id. at 1883 (reporting that subjects were first asked to rank relative
severity of twenty-four crimes and then, only upon completion, asked to rank twelve new crimes
in relation to existing twenty-four-crime framework; the subjects showed consistency in ranking
twenty-four crimes, but exhibited less agreement with respect to relative ranking of twelve new
crimes). It may also suggest, as the authors contend, that “the closer conduct is to the core of
physical injury of persons or property, takings without consent, and deception in exchanges,
the greater will be present-day agreement about its relative blameworthiness.” Id. at 1891.
136. See Stuntz, supra note 9, at 2174 (“The large majority of Terry stops are based on
suspicion of one of a half-dozen offenses.”); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 80, at 204 tbl.299
(reporting statistical breakdown of United States arrests by crime).
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A final consideration is whether to permit differentiation between
offenses nominally categorized as identical. Should the teenager’s kick in
United States v. Schmidt137 be distinguished from a near fatal stabbing, even
though both offenses could be deemed assault with a dangerous weapon? It
seems that the overarching inquiry as to “reasonableness” requires an
affirmative answer.138 Nevertheless, such departures from a general offense
categorization should be rare. As discussed in Part III.B, if courts focus
myopically on case-specific classification, there is a danger that they will
deem all crime “grave” or “serious,” rendering the notion of relative crime
severity meaningless.
IV. APPLYING THE CRIME-SEVERITY FRAMEWORK
The preceding Part sketches the contours of a framework for
identifying a crime-severity variable that can be incorporated into
assessments of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. This Part explores
specific applications of this approach. It begins by distinguishing the
application of a crime-severity variable in two doctrinal settings—one where
incorporation of crime severity will be relatively easy and, a second, where
incorporation is more difficult.
A. INCORPORATING CRIME SEVERITY INTO GENERAL REASONABLENESS ASSESSMENTS
Crime-severity considerations can be most readily incorporated into the
pockets of Fourth Amendment doctrine governed solely by freeform
reasonableness analysis. In these so-called “special needs” contexts, crime
severity would simply become one of the common-sense considerations that
courts apply in assessing “reasonableness, under all the circumstances.”139
For example, school searches fall into the “special needs” category.
Consequently, “the legality of a search of a student” depends “simply on the

137. United States v. Schmidt, 403 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2005).
138. See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 866 (arguing in context of regulating prosecutor’s
subpoena authority that crime-severity distinctions should not only be substantive, but
“thoroughly case-specific”).
139. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (evaluating searches of public-school
students). This “inconsistent tangle of case law” is difficult to characterize. For a general
discussion, see Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59
DUKE L.J. 843, 926 (2010) (concluding that the doctrine consists of “an inconsistent tangle of
case law, justified by a broad Fourth Amendment loophole whose premise—that detecting and
preventing violent crime is not a law enforcement purpose—borders on the absurd”); see also
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 639 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the Court has recognized “‘special needs’ exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment . . . in a patchwork quilt of settings: public school principals’ searches of students’
belongings, T.L.O.; public employers’ searches of employees’ desks, O’Connor; and probation
officers’ searches of probationers’ homes, Griffin,” where “each time the Court has found that
‘special needs’ counseled ignoring the literal requirements of the Fourth Amendment for such
full-scale searches in favor of a formless and unguided ‘reasonableness’ balancing inquiry”).
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reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”140 Under
existing doctrine, however, one circumstance appears out of bounds. The
Supreme Court has emphasized that the legality of a school search is not
“dependent upon a judge’s evaluation of the relative importance of various
school rules.”141 Justice Stevens’s response to this point in dissent resonates
far beyond the school-search context: “[f]or the Court, a search for curlers
and sunglasses in order to enforce the school dress code is apparently just as
important as a search for evidence of heroin addiction or violent gang
activity.”142
Of course, a search to enforce the school dress code is not as important
as the same search to investigate a violent crime, and the doctrine should
reflect that intuition. In fact, once a workable framework for evaluating
relative seriousness is constructed, crime severity should be a central variable
(along with intrusiveness) in assessing the reasonableness of school searches.
Whether a school official conducts a strip search of a student or monitors
students electronically (intercepting e-mail, videotaping school bathrooms,
or via GPS tracking), a court evaluating the constitutionality of that search
should weigh its intrusiveness against the public interest. Public interest,
here, should be defined both by the quantum of suspicion that a student
violated some rule and the seriousness of the rule violated. All things being
equal, a search aimed at identifying a student rapist (a “grave” crime) would
be on firmer constitutional ground than the same search to determine if
students were stealing soda, smoking in the bathroom, or leaving campus for
lunch (“minor” offenses).
Due to the unbounded nature of the constitutional analysis in this
context, no further rules (apart from those already developed in the
preceding Part) are necessary. A crime-severity variable can be factored into
the freeform reasonableness calculus just like any other pertinent
consideration, causing searches that target minor crimes more likely to be
deemed unreasonable, and searches that target grave offenses more likely to
be deemed reasonable.
B. CRIME SEVERITY AND BRIGHT-LINE RULES
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence often relies on so-called bright-line
rules to separate government actions that are per se reasonable from those
that are per se unreasonable.143 While it is easiest to incorporate crime

140. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
141. Id. at 342 n.9. The Supreme Court’s existing school-search jurisprudence provides
mixed signals on the propriety of crime-severity considerations, holding that such
considerations are irrelevant in determining if a search is reasonable in its inception, but
perhaps relevant to determining the permissible scope of that search. Id.
142. Id. at 377, 380 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9, § 2.9(f), at 102–03 (describing the Court’s
inconsistent approach to bright-line rules in the Fourth Amendment context).
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severity (or any variable) into the freeform reasonableness analysis discussed
in the preceding Part, crime severity can also be incorporated into an
analysis governed by bright-line rules. Indeed, this is essentially what the
Supreme Court did in Welsh—creating a “minor crime” exception to an
exigent-circumstances rule that otherwise permitted warrantless entry.
The general approach would be fairly straightforward. If a rule would
ordinarily render a search or seizure per se reasonable, the defendant (in a
close case) could invoke an exception when the targeted offense was
“minor.” Conversely, if a rule would deem a search or seizure per se
unreasonable, the government could invoke an exception if the targeted
offense was “grave.” Unlike in Welsh, however (and more like Illinois v.
McArthur),144 the invocation of these exceptions should not determine the
issue. Rather, the availability of the exception would free the legal analysis
from the confines of the bright-line rule, allowing “totality of the
circumstances,” reasonableness balancing, as in the “special needs” context.
The mechanics of the proposed approach can be explored by revisiting
Atwater and Mincey.145 In Atwater, the Court claimed to be hamstrung by the
per se rule deeming an arrest reasonable whenever an officer had probable
cause to suspect a person of a crime. Consequently, a custodial arrest of a
parent in a car full of children for a seatbelt violation became per se
reasonable, as opposed to actually reasonable, even though the seatbelt
violation was not a jailable offense.146 The alternative approach proposed
here would allow the suspect in a case like Atwater to invoke an exception to
the per se rule based on the “minor” nature of her underlying offense. Her
seizure could then be individually analyzed in light of its intrusiveness and
the public interest furthered to determine Fourth Amendment
reasonableness. While this approach inevitably requires some degree of caseby-case analysis, various categories of arrests for minor offenses would likely
become de facto reasonable—e.g., arrests necessary to fingerprint a suspect
who has no identification, to protect the suspect or others (e.g., public
drunkenness), or to prevent ongoing violations. The simple fact of an
offense, however, would no longer establish the reasonableness of an arrest.
The advantages of the doctrinal change described above would not
accrue solely to suspects. An analogous approach, favoring law enforcement,
144. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001). The Court in McArthur, after applying the
general exigent-circumstances rule to affirm the constitutionality of the search, noted that the
offense at issue—drug possession—was fairly minor and seemed to find it necessary to evaluate
the overall reasonableness of the contested search in comparison to the search in Welsh. The
Court emphasized that the offense was not as minor as the one in Welsh and the intrusion less
severe. Id. at 336; see discussion supra Part I.C.
145. See discussion of Atwater and Mincey supra Part I.A.
146. See Brian J. Foley, Policing from the Gut: Anti-Intellectualism in American Criminal Procedure,
69 MD. L. REV. 261, 280 (2010) (noting that under any regime with bright-line rules, it is
inevitable that some people will have their rights violated and that “[t]hese people are a sort of
collateral damage from the bright-line rule”).
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could be applied in cases like Mincey, where a bright-line rule forbidding
certain actions would yield in an investigation of a grave offense. Again, caseby-case analysis would be required, but de facto rules would inevitably result.
For example, a rule like that once followed by the Arizona courts could
permit warrantless searches (with probable cause) of single-family residences
whenever police, having lawfully entered, encounter a victim of a “grave”
crime.147
C. OBJECTIONS TO OBSCURING BRIGHT-LINE RULES
A likely objection to the approach sketched in the preceding section is
that it will reduce the clarity of Fourth Amendment doctrine, particularly
with respect to those areas of search and seizure law governed by bright-line
rules. According to the most general form of this objection, introducing any
new variable into the calculus complicates the task of police officers and
increases the potential for inconsistency and confusion in the lower
courts.148
There are two responses to this objection. First, it overstates the clarity
and efficacy of existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. Even the so-called
bright-line rules that dot the Fourth Amendment landscape are intersecting,
multilayered, highly nuanced, and rarely absolute.149 As Albert Alschuler
explains, these rules often “muddy rather than clarify” and fail to recognize
that a critical component of police work is the exercise of overall judgment
in line with a broad “rule of reason” (i.e., reasonableness) that ultimately
may be preferable as a constitutional standard, “not only from the

147. See State v. Sample, 489 P.2d 44, 46 (Ariz. 1971) (allowing police to “mak[e] a
warrantless search of the premises in which the victim is found dead”).
148. Orin Kerr provides a practical defense of clear rules governing police-officer conduct,
arguing that courts must provide clear guidance to minimize social costs of the exclusionary
rule. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 527–28
(2007); cf. Anne Bowen Poulin, The Fourth Amendment: Elusive Standards; Elusive Review, 67 CHI.KENT L. REV. 127, 143–44 (1991) (explaining that when “the court intends [F]ourth
[A]mendment rules to guide and influence police behavior, the court will try to define the rule
in terms that a law enforcement officer can hope to understand and apply with some degree of
accuracy”). This imperative for clear rules is less compelling here, however, because the
proposed divergence from the bright-line rules increases the likelihood of exclusion only when
police investigate less serious crimes. (Although, in some instances, evidence of serious offenses
would be excluded if obtained during an investigation of a minor offense.) Further, the
divergence has the countervailing effect of decreasing the likelihood of exclusion when police
investigate grave crimes.
149. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (explaining that the rule
authorizing vehicle searches incident to arrest, while “touted as providing a ‘bright line’” had,
in fact, “generated a great deal of uncertainty”); Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the
Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 230 (1984) (critiquing argument that bright-line
rules are preferable to more generic standards in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); cf.
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 125 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment does not insist upon bright-line rules. Rather, it recognizes that no single set of
legal rules can capture the ever-changing complexity of human life.”).
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perspective of the sound administration of public justice, but also from the
perspective of the officer himself.”150 Take, for example, the search of the
home—a paradigmatic privacy invasion that courts, after centuries of
jurisprudence, regulate with some of the clearest doctrinal rules. The
doctrine begins with a “presumpt[ion]” that an officer must have a warrant
to enter a home.151 Even with a warrant, though, an officer cannot enter the
home if the warrant is facially defective,152 which means “obviously deficient”
(not that it “simply omit[s] a few items from a list of many to be seized, or
misdescribe[s] a few of several items. . . [or contains] what fairly could be
characterized as a mere technical mistake or typographical error”).153 An
officer does not need a warrant to enter a home if the officer receives
consent from the occupant, or someone else with “apparent authority”
(except if a co-occupant, also present, disagrees),154 or there are “exigent
circumstances,” which means “‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the
needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”155 Of course, under
Welsh, this last “rule” does not apply if the targeted offense is “relatively
minor.”156 In addition, police can only rely on exigent circumstances to
justify a warrantless search so long as they did not “violate or threaten to
violate the Fourth Amendment prior to the exigency.”157 To call this thicket
a bright-line rule governing the entry of a home is an insult to lines (or
brightness). And this is about as clear as it gets.
Akhil Amar exaggerates when he critiques Fourth Amendment
doctrine’s pretension to concrete rules as follows: “[w]arrants are not
required—unless they are”; “[a]ll searches and seizures must be grounded in
probable cause—but not on Tuesdays.”158 The critique, however, rests on a
central truth. It is often Fourth Amendment doctrine’s artificiality, not its
lack of clarity, that most complicates the police officer’s task. Thus, while
offense-severity distinctions may add an additional variable to search and
seizure law, this variable simultaneously conforms that law to the
overarching constitutional command of reasonableness, a command that
may be easier to follow than many of the bright-line rules intended to give it
effect.

150. Alschuler, supra note 149, at 231, 234.
151. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
152. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004).
153. Id.
154. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006).
155. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978)).
156. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984).
157. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1863 (2011).
158. Amar, supra note 12, at 757.
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A second response to the criticism that crime severity complicates
existing doctrine is that if, in fact, clarity and reasonableness conflict,
reasonableness should carry the day. It is, after all, reasonableness that the
Constitution commands. Consequently, courts cannot lightly deem as
“reasonable” an unreasonable search on the grounds of administrative
convenience (although that is what occurs in cases like Atwater). Such
sacrifices may be called for in extreme circumstances of administrative
necessity, but as this Article has tried to show, it is far from clear that such
circumstances justify transsubstantive doctrine. Indeed, the Supreme Court
recognizes that reasonableness trumps clarity in the paradigmatic
circumstance where officers need ex ante clarity—the use of deadly force.
Rather than adopt the bright-line rule urged upon it to allow deadly force to
stop any fleeing felon, the Supreme Court requires officers to consider, inter
alia, offense seriousness in assessing whether deadly force is permitted.159
While such a rule arguably complicates the officer’s task, the rule must do so
if it is to give effect to the Fourth Amendment’s “central requirement” of
reasonableness.160 What is true for deadly force seizures is true for Fourth
Amendment law generally.
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF CRIME-SEVERITY DISTINCTIONS IN THE MODERN ERA
The preceding Parts sketch the argument that crime severity should,
and can be, incorporated into Fourth Amendment reasonableness
assessments. The argument presented so far is timeless in that it applies
equally to a search in 1797 or 2097. Indeed, judges may object on this
ground: Fourth Amendment doctrine has worked well enough for decades
without crime-severity distinctions, why change now? One answer, which will
be developed in this Part, is that while Fourth Amendment doctrine may
have been able to subsist without crime-severity distinctions in the past, its
continued ability to do so is uncertain at best. This is because the distinct
types of investigative techniques courts will confront in the coming decades
are likely to exacerbate critical weaknesses in existing Fourth Amendment
doctrine, leaving a gap that crime-severity analysis (or something like it)
must fill.
Traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine performs best when assessing
venerable methods of search and seizure—a police officer stops a suspect on
a street, pats down his clothes, looks through the suspect’s pockets, and
ultimately, searches his home for items specified in a warrant. These types of

159. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 20 (1985) (recognizing the “practical difficulties”
inherent in the Court’s rule but emphasizing that “similarly difficult judgments must be made
by the police in equally uncertain circumstances”); cf. Stuntz, supra note 9, at 2175 (arguing
that “vagueness” is an overrated problem in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and that the
central question in crafting legal rules is “whether police officers can know roughly where the
boundaries are in practice”).
160. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001).
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searches generally fall within the broad middle ground of a hypothetical
invasiveness spectrum; they unambiguously intrude upon an individual’s
privacy (or mobility), but do so only partially, leaving much of the
individual’s privacy intact.
The next wave of controversial searches will differ from those
traditionally encountered in two important ways. First, for some intrusions,
the degree of privacy invasion will increase exponentially. The partial privacy
invasions of a physical search of one’s possessions, car, or even a home will
appear quaint in comparison to the invasions that can be accomplished with
modern technologies. Second, modern technologies will simultaneously
enable remarkably unintrusive techniques to gather much of the data that,
traditionally, only a more intrusive search would reveal. These opposing
facets of technologically enhanced searches will increasingly present
difficulties for courts applying traditional doctrine. As discussed below,
crime-severity distinctions, while not the entire answer, provide a ready
means of alleviating these difficulties.
1. The Importance of Crime-Severity Distinctions for Evaluating
Particularly Intrusive Searches
The coming storm in Fourth Amendment doctrine is particularly
evident in the doctrine’s longstanding struggle to evaluate the
reasonableness of unusually intrusive searches. When the Court confronts
such searches, it inevitably abandons the otherwise applicable bright-line
rules in favor of either case-specific, reasonableness assessments161 or special,
new rules that apply only to a particularly intrusive type of search or
seizure.162 Exemplifying the latter practice is the inglorious constitutional
standard that governs border searches of a suspect’s alimentary canal.163
Technological change will exacerbate existing doctrine’s difficulties
with unusually intrusive searches. Modern technologies enable an increasing
array of searches that, while not necessarily physically intrusive, have the
potential to wholly eviscerate an individual’s privacy. For example, courts are
just beginning to encounter the panoply of issues created by the
proliferation of electronic hard drives (e.g., personal computers, flash
drives, Blackberries, and iPhones) that, under existing doctrine, can
purportedly be searched without a warrant or probable cause if encountered

161. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (ruling that compelled surgery to
obtain a bullet from suspect’s body was unreasonable because the surgery was not without risk
and the state could probably prove its case without the bullet).
162. See discussion of Garner supra Part I.C.
163. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 & n.4 (1985) (crafting
special Fourth Amendment rule to permit customs agents to detain a suspect at the border for
the purpose of monitoring her bowel movement but emphasizing that the rule does not
necessarily apply to “strip, body cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches”).
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during the course of an arrest, or without a warrant, if found in a car.164 In
theory, such searches can be carried out even for trivial offenses such as the
seatbelt violation in Atwater or, as the Fourth Circuit recently held, failing to
disclose one’s name to a police officer.165
The potential for traditional search and seizure doctrines, if left
unaltered, to permit wholly “unreasonable” privacy intrusions is increasing
not only because people store unprecedented amounts of private data on
readily searchable electronic devices, but also because new technology allows
the government to replace traditional surveillance techniques with far more
comprehensive means of gathering information. In the coming years, the
“stakeout” will be replaced by video surveillance and continuous GPS
tracking. As the District of Columbia Circuit recently held, the difference in
kind of the intrusiveness of this last form of surveillance from previous
iterations renders the answers given by traditional doctrine (that no “search”
occurs) obsolete.166 Video surveillance presents similar concerns, particularly
where technology allows police to install miniature devices in private spaces
that can capture and transmit video footage for weeks, months, or years at a
time. Under existing doctrine, the Fourth Amendment’s strongest response to
the enormous privacy invasions on the horizon is to require a warrant and
probable cause that the surveillance will uncover evidence of a crime.167 In
other words, nothing but the good graces of law enforcement and limited
resources stands between the citizenry and cameras hidden in countless
homes, watching for days on end, to ferret out evidence of marijuana
possession or cable-television theft.168

164. See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1088 (10th Cir.) (considering but
declining to decide whether police could conduct a warrantless search of a laptop computer
seized during a vehicle stop), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1028 (2009); United States v. Finley, 477
F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that officer could search suspect’s cell phone without a
warrant as search incident to arrest); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 511 (Cal. 2011) (upholding
search of defendant’s cell phone incident to arrest); Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the
Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 29 (2008) (explaining that authority to search a
suspect’s iPhone incident to arrest “appears to follow from longstanding U.S. Supreme Court
precedent laid down well before handheld technology was even contemplated”).
165. United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411–12 (4th Cir. 2009) (upholding
warrantless search of car passenger’s cell phone after arrest for giving a false name).
166. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566 (D.C. Cir.) (disagreeing with other courts
that have deemed continuous GPS monitoring not to be a search), cert. granted sub nom. United
States v. Jones, 2011 WL 1456728 (2010).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 603 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting the
“lengthy string of state court cases holding that citizens have a reasonable expectation not to be
secretly surveilled inside a public bathroom stall” and, thus, that a warrant is required for such
surveillance); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 1984).
168. Law enforcement’s use of this power (i.e., its “good graces”) will undoubtedly be
shaped by political as well as judicial forces. An optimist might suggest that this means that such
invasive searches will be shunned by police to avoid popular resentment, but a pessimist would
counter that, at most, these forces will cause such searches to be borne by the least politically
powerful such as minorities and the poor. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth
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The Seventh Circuit case of United States v. Torres illustrates the limits of
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine with respect to unusually invasive,
technologically enhanced searches.169 Torres evaluated surreptitious video
surveillance conducted inside a suspected terrorist safe house pursuant to a
warrant. In struggling with the case, the court emphasized the inadequacy of
the “usual way” judges protect privacy interests (requiring probable cause
and mandating warrants).170 The Seventh Circuit ultimately upheld the
search, but at the same time, hinted at the approach advocated in this
Article, stating: “[M]aybe in dealing with so intrusive a technique as
television surveillance, other methods of control as well, such as banning the
technique outright from use in the home in connection with minor crimes,
will be required, in order to strike a proper balance between public safety
and personal privacy.”171
In a more recent case, United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., an
en banc Ninth Circuit panel recognized the inadequacy of traditional
doctrinal safeguards (warrant requirements and probable cause) where the
government seized large volumes of private electronic data (including
private data of non-suspects) in an investigation of steroid use by
professional athletes.172 Unable to take comfort, as the Seventh Circuit had,
in the severity of the underlying offense, the panel rejected the seizure by
deeming the government to have exceeded the scope of the warrants issued
by the lower courts.173 Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit also sought to curb
future excesses by crafting from whole cloth a series of hoops that the
government would have to jump through to obtain warrants for electronic
data.174 In the wake of the ruling, prosecutors claimed to be “hobbled” in

Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1272 (1999) (“Privacy, as Fourth Amendment
law defines it, is something people tend to have a lot of only when they also have a lot of other
things.”).
169. Torres, 751 F.2d 875.
170. Id. at 882.
171. Id. The court did not elaborate on how such a limitation might work, and the “minor
crimes” dicta does not appear to have achieved any traction in later case law.
172. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1004 (9th Cir. 2009)
(stating that “electronic files are generally found on media that also contain thousands or
millions of other files among which the sought-after data may be stored or concealed” and “[b]y
necessity, government efforts to locate particular files will require examining a great many
other files to exclude the possibility that the sought-after data are concealed there”), superseded
by 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010).
173. Id. at 1003–04.
174. Id. at 1006 (crafting novel set of five rules for magistrates to follow in determining
whether to issue warrant “to examine a computer hard drive or electronic storage medium in
searching for certain incriminating files, or when a search for evidence could result in the
seizure of a computer”); see also United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir.) (opining
that panel’s forward looking requirements were not supported by Supreme Court case law), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 3525 (2010).
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other (more serious) investigations and petitioned for rehearing.175 The
Justice Department’s brief in support of its request focused, predictably, not
on the need to aggressively investigate professional athletes, but on the
public’s interest in investigating child rapists, “spies and terrorists.”176
Perhaps bowing to the weight of transsubstantive doctrine, the Ninth Circuit
granted rehearing and rescinded the forward looking aspects of its earlier
ruling, removing the obstacles that might have stymied the government in its
investigations of more serious crimes.177
As the Seventh and Ninth Circuit rulings indicate, existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine must be reshaped to meet the challenges presented by
technological change. The precise parameters of the new doctrine will, of
course, be worked out over time, but a potential approach suggested by the
analysis thus far would be to use crime severity to create distinct categories
of review for unusually intrusive surveillance. When law enforcement
requests a warrant to conduct sweeping electronic data searches, video
surveillance of private spaces, continuous GPS monitoring, and the like, the
courts could separate such requests by crime seriousness. In the first
category where police are targeting “minor crimes,” these searches should
be deemed per se unreasonable and no warrant would issue. In the second
category of “serious crimes,” reasonableness may depend on the
government’s observing certain restrictions, such as those crafted by the
Ninth Circuit panel in Comprehensive Drug Testing or suggested by
commentators anticipating the dilemma presented in that case.178 In
investigations of “grave” crimes, as in Torres, warrants would issue with the
least or, as at present, no restrictions (assuming, of course, the requisite
quantum of individualized suspicion is established). Whatever the precise
doctrinal approach, however, where privacy invasions far exceed those
involved in traditional searches, it is critical that courts consider all the
circumstances, including crime severity, in assessing reasonableness. This
will ensure that, when considering the breathtaking privacy intrusions
looming on the technological horizon, courts can determine whether these

175. See John Roemer, Electronic Evidence Rules Now Hobbling Prosecutors, DAILY J., Aug. 11,
2010.
176. Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full Court at 6–7,
16, United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., Nos. 05-10067, 05-15006, 05-55354
(9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2009). The brief never mentions the word “steroid” but does detail a stalled
investigation into the rape of a four-year-old girl and a “complex national security case.” Id.
177. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1177 (calling “for greater vigilance on the part
of judicial officers in striking the right balance between the government’s interest in law
enforcement and the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures”);
see also id. at 1178–79 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (reiterating superseded requirements as
purported “guidance”).
178. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 1005, 1006–07 (2010); Ohm, supra note 16, at 1558.
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searches are actually reasonable as opposed to some artificial, and ultimately
incomplete, proxy for reasonableness.
2. The Importance of Crime-Severity Distinctions for Applying the
“Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test to Relatively Uninvasive Searches
While some new technologies enable extremely intrusive searches,
others allow the state to gather vast amounts of private information in a
manner that, at least as a matter of legal doctrine, is remarkably unintrusive.
These latter intrusions fall into roughly two categories: (1) technologies that
allow the state to gather private information, often from large groups of
people, without decisively intruding on any one individual’s privacy (e.g., email filters, data mining, facial recognition software, familial DNA searches,
and satellite imagery); and (2) technologies that allow the state to obtain
private data about a suspect from a third party (e.g., searches of data
obtained from phone companies, Internet service providers, or website
operators, such as Google or Facebook). Current doctrine potentially leaves
these types of privacy intrusions unregulated as “nonsearches” under the
Fourth Amendment because they do not violate any “reasonable expectation
of privacy.”179 Recognizing the staggering implications of this doctrinal blind
spot, academics rightly criticize existing case law as out of touch with
modern reality, rendering the Fourth Amendment increasingly irrelevant in
a changing world.180
179. See United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding no Fourth
Amendment search where government obtained subscriber information from Internet service
provider after chat recipient informed government that defendant showed child pornographic
video during Internet chat), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 440 (2010); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9,
§ 4.4(c), at 296 (recognizing that “the Fourth Amendment status of e-mail is still unsettled” and
asserting that the argument that e-mail is not protected because it is revealed to a third party
ISP is “plausible” but “probably not a winning” argument); Junichi P. Semitsu, From Facebook to
Mug Shot: How the Dearth of Social Networking Privacy Rights Revolutionized Online Government
Surveillance, 31 PACE L. REV. 291 (2011); Solove, supra note 15, at 356–57 (noting that
“companies maintain detailed records of individuals’ personal information,” including
“internet service providers, merchants, bookstores, phone companies, [and] cable companies”
and when this data is provided to the government, third-party doctrine eliminates Fourth
Amendment protections); infra note 180.
180. See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA.
L. REV. 9, 83 (2004) (arguing that “the allure of electronic surveillance to law enforcement and
its threat to privacy requires a comprehensive and workable framework that strictly limits
government’s ability to surveil”); Kerr, supra note 178, at 1006–07 (recognizing that “the
application of the Fourth Amendment to computer networks will require considerable
rethinking of preexisting law”); Ohm, supra note 16, at 1558 (advocating increased Fourth
Amendment protections because “reasonable expectations of privacy and the probable cause
standard are not enough to ensure a sound balance between privacy and security in the face of
widespread intermediation”); John Palfrey, The Public and the Private at the United States Border
with Cyberspace, 78 MISS. L.J. 241, 294 (2008) (“[I]t is time to rethink whether the scope of the
Fourth Amendment is sufficient to protect individual privacy from intrusion by the state,
especially with respect to data initially collected by private parties.”); Simmons, supra note 55, at
1306 (arguing that if the Court continues on its current path, its doctrine “will inevitably
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One consideration that has not been raised in the important debate
regarding the Fourth Amendment parameters of novel technological
intrusions is crime severity. At first glance, crime severity does not seem to
implicate the threshold Fourth Amendment determination of whether an
investigative tactic constitutes a “search.” A crime-severity variable, however,
could quite plausibly be incorporated into the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test that the Supreme Court uses to draw the search–nonsearch
distinction. This is because a critical component of this famously amorphous
test is a “value judgment,”181 described by the Court as: whether a particular
privacy interest is one that “society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.”182
Surveys that attempt to measure societal perceptions of the relative
intrusiveness of police conduct conducted by Christopher Slobogin and
Joseph Schumacher suggest that, at least as a descriptive matter, the privacy
expectations that society would deem reasonable fluctuate with crime
severity.183 As Slobogin explains, in the survey results, “the seriousness of the
crime under investigation correlated inversely with intrusiveness ratings;
result—indeed, has already resulted—in a gradual weakening of Fourth Amendment
protections as investigative technologies become more sophisticated”); Omer Tene, What Google
Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1470 (“[C]onstitutional
doctrine for privacy protection in the United States is overly narrow and outdated, particularly
in light of the market and technological developments of the past three decades.”). Other
means of limiting privacy intrusions exist (e.g., through statutes), but none can provide as
broad or as lasting protection as the Fourth Amendment.
181. SLOBOGIN, supra note 77, at 33 (criticizing the Court’s approach to this prong of the
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 403 (1974) (arguing that the question courts should ask is
“whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go
unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to
citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open
society”); Kerr, supra note 148, at 505 (critiquing the test as follows: “Is it descriptive? Is it
normative? Just what does it measure? The cases are all over the map, and the Justices have
declined to resolve the confusion”). Justice Harlan, the author of the test, suggested a
normative approach dissenting in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (“This question must . . . be answered by assessing the nature of a particular practice
and the likely extent of its impact on the individual’s sense of security balanced against the
utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement.”).
182. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (describing reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy inquiry as consisting of “two discrete questions”: (1) “whether the individual, by his
conduct, has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,”; (2) “whether the
individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
183. See generally Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized
and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 767 (1993). Slobogin’s contention that the Court
should incorporate population surveys as to the invasiveness of particular techniques, see
generally SLOBOGIN, supra note 77, is analogous to the suggestion in Part III.C that the Court
should incorporate surveys of crime severity in its assessment of the relative gravity of offenses.
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thus, for instance, the scenario involving a pat-down for evidence of
terrorism was seen as much less intrusive than the pat-down scenario that
did not specify the evidence sought.”184 Given these findings, which support
a fairly unsurprising intuition, a court grappling with the question of
whether an investigative technique constitutes a “search,” could plausibly
consider the severity of the crime under investigation.185
Importantly, the Supreme Court’s omission of a crime-severity variable
from the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test,186 as in other areas of Fourth
Amendment doctrine, does not mean that the underlying intuition—that
police officers act more reasonably (or less intrusively) when, all things
being equal, their investigations target grave crime—disappears. To the
contrary, the intuition is simply pushed underground, causing courts to
gravitate toward other mechanisms for protecting society. Judges, like all of
us, prefer that law enforcement employ all of its resources—where
“reasonable”—to combat the most grave crimes. Transsubstantive doctrine,
which artificially strips crime severity from the reasonableness calculation,
creates a powerful incentive for courts to err on the side of deeming
applications of challenged new technologies “nonsearches” for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment.187 This temptation is particularly acute where a

184. See Slobogin, supra note 28, at 1598; Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 183, at 767
(discussing variances in intrusiveness ratings for identical investigative tactics and explaining
that a “possible explanation . . . is that the subjects allowed their attitudes toward the types of
crime being investigated to affect their answers”). Slobogin views crime-severity-based variance
in intrusiveness as “noise” that distorts the actual intrusiveness. This conclusion is not, however,
the only one to be drawn from the data. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal et al., The Multiple Dimensions
of Privacy: Testing Lay “Expectations of Privacy,” 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 353–54 (2009)
(discussing Slobogin and Schumacher’s findings that providing subjects with context regarding,
inter alia, the purpose of a search influenced the subjects’ views of intrusiveness and criticizing
their conclusion that these findings suggest a flaw in the subjects’ intrusiveness assessments:
“Doctrinally, that may not be so; psychologically, it is not clear that there are explicit grounds
for making such a choice.” (citation omitted)).
185. Although plausible, this approach would likely be unsatisfactory, not because it distorts
the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, but because it moves the test far afield from its
ostensible purpose—determining whether an investigative technique falls within the definition
of the word “search.” As a consequence, incorporating crime severity into assessments of
reasonable expectations of privacy could lead to the implosion of the test altogether, perhaps
rightly so. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing
the “notoriously unhelpful” reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test and advocating a return to
the “clear text” of the Fourth Amendment “and 4-century-old tradition” of the meaning of the
terms utilized there); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511
(2010).
186. The Court generally acknowledges the context dependence of societal expectations of
privacy, but not with respect to crime severity. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 654 (1995) (“What expectations are legitimate varies, of course, with context, . . .
depending, for example, upon whether the individual asserting the privacy interest is at home,
at work, in a car, or in a public park.”).
187. Cf. SLOBOGIN, supra note 77, at 31 (criticizing Supreme Court’s doctrine as follows:
“the only good explanation for the Court’s unwillingness to regulate so many actions that are
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technology is generally applied prior to the development of individualized
suspicion—e.g., data mining, DNA searches, or facial recognition software—
and, thus, deeming its use a “search” and requiring a warrant (based on
probable cause) is tantamount to branding its use unconstitutional in all
cases. Once applied, the “nonsearch” label leaves applications of the
technology completely unregulated by the Fourth Amendment; the
technology can then be utilized not just to (reasonably) combat grave
crimes, but to (unreasonably) investigate minor ones as well.
The incentive to label applications of cutting edge technologies
“nonsearches” so that the technologies are then available to combat grave
crime recedes once courts are permitted to consider offense severity in
assessing reasonableness. Courts can then deem the use of such technologies
“searches” constrained by Fourth Amendment reasonableness, while
reserving the authority to uphold those searches as “reasonable” if, and only
if, the circumstances, including crime severity, warrant. Thus, by more
closely aligning Fourth Amendment reasonableness, with actual
reasonableness, a doctrine that incorporates crime severity would likely
capture more “searches.” This development (or its absence) will become
increasingly significant as minimally invasive, but nonetheless disturbingly
efficient, investigative techniques become ubiquitous in the modern era.
CONCLUSION
Proponents of the government’s reliance on powerful new investigative
technologies commonly (and understandably) invoke the specter of
increasingly sophisticated and dangerous criminals.188 Yet, the omission of
crime severity from existing Fourth Amendment doctrine allows the
government to use the same technologies (as well as time-honored

clearly searches and seizures is that it has decided that the cost to law enforcement of doing so
outweighs the ‘minimal’ intrusions involved”). For a possible demonstration of the courts’
nervousness about labeling the use of new technologies a search, see Warshak v. United States,
490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[I]ndividuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy
in e-mails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a commercial ISP.”); Warshak v.
United States, 532 F.3d 521, 522 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (vacating panel opinion due to lack
of standing).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 883 (7th Cir. 1984) (emphasizing
dangers posed by terrorism suspects in upholding video surveillance as reasonable); Arcila,
supra note 33, at 1334 (emphasizing pressure placed on Fourth Amendment doctrine by the
9/11 attacks and potential biological, chemical, and technological attacks in a similar vein);
Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 579–81 (2009)
(defending third party doctrine, in part, as a means to prevent criminals from using new
technologies to shield activities that previously would have to be performed in public);
Simmons, supra note 15, at 562 (discussing how modern criminals can use new technologies to
cause great damage: “An anarchist in the nineteenth century might seek to assassinate a
president or plant dynamite in an opera house—his twenty-first century counterpart has the
ability to destroy cities with a nuclear weapon or poison an entire society with chemical or
biological agents” (footnote omitted)).
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techniques of varying intrusiveness) to investigate unsophisticated criminals
and relatively insignificant crimes.189 Separating these distinct categories of
crimes and criminals would provide a critical update to antiquated Fourth
Amendment doctrine.
There is nothing radical about the proposal advanced in this Article.
The “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,”190 and no
common conception of reasonableness is complete without an assessment of
the purpose of a particular search or seizure. A citywide dragnet for the
Oklahoma City bomber may be reasonable, while the same dragnet targeting
a parking ticket scofflaw would be absurd. The fact that Fourth Amendment
doctrine recognizes no distinction between these scenarios suggests a serious
flaw.191
The proposed framework for incorporating crime severity into Fourth
Amendment doctrine is no doubt vulnerable to criticism. Such
disagreement is not fatal, however. The proposal is intended to suggest that
crime severity can be incorporated into Fourth Amendment doctrine and to
ignite a debate as to the proper parameters of this powerful consideration.
As the debate unfolds, it is important to recognize that the status quo of
largely ignoring crime severity is itself problematic, and likely to become
increasingly so with technological change. The real question, then, is not
whether a certain scheme for incorporating crime severity is flawed, but
whether the scheme is more flawed than one that ignores crime severity
altogether.192

189. United States v. Hudson, 100 F.3d 1409, 1423 (9th Cir. 1996) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority for failing to incorporate into the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness inquiry the “glaring disproportionality between the intrusiveness of the raid and
the four-month-old sale of sixty dollars’ worth of drugs that was offered to justify the raid”);
Stuntz, supra note 8, at 853 (“Just as in some murder cases the law’s standards seem too high,
they seem too low in thousands of cases involving less important offenses.”).
190. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).
191. The distinction currently available in the case law only applies in exigent
circumstances (e.g., where the bomber is about to strike or immediately fleeing the crime). See
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
192. Stuntz, supra note 8, at 843 (highlighting problems with transsubstantive doctrine);
Volokh, supra note 10, at 1982 (noting difficulties of drawing lines between crimes but
emphasizing that “there are problems with treating all crimes alike as well”).

